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THE  
BENGAL REVERSION  
ANOTHER  
EXCEPTIONAL CASE,  

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MAJOR EVANS BELL.


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
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THE  
BENGAL REVERSION,

ANOTHER "EXCEPTIONAL CASE."



BY

MAJOR EVANS BELL,

AUTHOR OF "THE MYSORE REVERSION," "THE OXUS AND THE INDUS," ETC.

"If in the pride of our power, we ever forget the means by which it has been attained, and, casting away all our harvest of experience, are betrayed by a rash confidence in what we may deem our intrinsic strength to neglect those collateral means by which the great fabric of our power in India has hitherto been supported, we shall with our own hands precipitate the downfall of our authority."

SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

LONDON:  
TRÜBNER & CO., 60, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1872.

DS485  
B46B4

TO VIND  
AMBROSIAD

T. RICHARDS. 37, GREAT QUEEN STREET.

**HENRY MORSE STEPHENS**

## INTRODUCTION.

THE first actual outbreak of the Indian mutiny in 1857 took place at Berhampore, a military station on the banks of the Ganges about a hundred miles North of Calcutta. Sir John Kaye informs us that the place was "well suited by its position for the development of the desired results."

"For only a few" (five) "miles beyond it lay the city of Moorshedabad, the home of the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, the representative of the line of Soubahdars, who, under the Imperial Government, had once ruled that great Province. It was known that the Nawab, who, though stripped of his ancestral power, lived in a Palace with great wealth and titular dignity and the surroundings of a Court, was rankling under a sense of indignities put upon him by the British Government, and that there were thousands in the city who would have risen at the signal of one who, weak himself, was yet strong in the prestige of a great name. At Berhampore there were no European troops; there were none anywhere near to it. A Regiment of Native Infantry, the Nineteenth, was stationed there, with a corps of Irregular Cavalry, and a battery of post guns manned by Native gunners. It was not difficult to see that if these troops were to rise against their English officers, and the people of Moorshedabad were to fraternise with them in the name of the Nawab, all Bengal would soon be in a blaze. No

thoughts of this kind disturbed the minds of our people, but the truth was very patent to the understanding of their enemies."

The historian relates how the routine-action of our Government favoured the growth of the evil,—how detachments from the most disaffected Regiments of all came in succession to Berhampore "to spread by personal intercourse the great contagion of alarm," and were received by their comrades of the Nineteenth "open-armed and open-mouthed." He describes the state of excitement and panic—"so often the prelude of dangerous revolt,"—into which the station and its neighbourhood were thrown, and finally explains how the "hostile combinations, by which the mutiny of a Regiment might have been converted into the rebellion of a Province," were, at this time and place, baffled and overthrown.

"Under the guidance of Colonel George Macgregor, the Nawab Nazim of Bengal threw the weight of his influence into the scale on the side of order and peace; and whatsoever might have been stirring in the hearts of the Mussulman population of Moorshedabad, in the absence of any signal from their Chief, they remained outwardly quiescent."\*

The "indignities" that are very naturally supposed to have been "rankling" in the heart of the Nawab were not of distant date, and he had then very little prospect or hope of redress. Lord Dalhousie, in 1853, had pronounced the Nawab guilty of allowing "a monstrous outrage upon humanity" to be "perpetrated under his very eyes," on the mere assumption that his Highness must have been cognizant of whatever occurred in his hunting encampment, even when he was absent from it. A petty theft having been committed in the camp, two persons, a

\* *The Sepoy War*, vol. 1, chapter iv, p. 498-508.

boy and a beggar, were seized by the man who had been robbed, and violent measures were adopted by him and his companions to extort a confession and recover the goods. The two poor creatures were most cruelly beaten, and died a few days afterwards, and in the words of General Colin Mackenzie, who was Agent at Moorshedabad in 1858, and who carefully analysed the case in a report to Government,—“it is in the highest degree probable that they died from the beating, but there is no positive proof that they did so.” Several servants of the Nawab were tried on a charge of complicity in this murder—one of them, Aman Ali Khan, being a confidential chamberlain,—and were acquitted. The guilty parties were convicted and condemned. Lord Dalhousie, in defiance of the solemn verdict of the highest Court of Justice in India, decided that Aman Ali Khan, who had been acquitted, *was guilty*, and that the act of his Highness in agreeing with the Sudder Nizamut by believing him innocent, was a proof of his favour and affection for a murderer. He called for an explanation, but the expressions he used in so doing sufficiently show that he had made up his mind not only as to the guilt of the acquitted persons, but as to that of the Nawab Nazim himself. The Nawab Nazim was required to state “why he failed to exert his authority to prevent the perpetration of so outrageous a crime, *almost in his very presence*”, thus taking for granted that his Highness had known all about it.

The Nawab sent in an explanation which any impartial person would consider amply sufficient, but which Lord Dalhousie declared to be “most unsatisfactory”. In reply to Lord Dalhousie’s inquiry “why he continued to show favour and countenance to those who” (in his Lordship’s opinion, not in that of the Judges) “were concerned in the murder,” the Nazim naturally replied that

“when they were acquitted by the Sudder Court, after being so strictly tried, *I really thought them to be not guilty.*” The Nawab was peremptorily required by the Governor-General “to dismiss them altogether from his service,” and to “hold no further communication with any of them.” The Agent, Colonel Macgregor, was required to “report within one week” whether “this requisition had been complied with or not.”

We shall quote one more passage from the Narrative of 1858 by General Colin Mackenzie.

“His Highness had an undoubted right to be of the same opinion as the Sudder Nizamut, but this Lord Dalhousie would by no means permit, and being in the only position in the world in which a British Sovereign or subject can punish those who have been legally acquitted, he decided that the eunuchs were guilty, and punished his Highness for believing them innocent, not only by depriving him of air and exercise, and of his right to have his travelling expenses paid from the Deposit Fund, but by recommending to the Court of Directors to diminish his Highness’s stipend, to take away the salute of nineteen guns due to his rank as the acknowledged equal and brother of the Governor-General, or at least to diminish it to thirteen, ‘so that the Nawab should no longer receive in public as he now does, higher honours than the Members of the Supreme Government of India!’ He even declined to comply with an indent for military stores required for the Nazim’s use, and brought in a Bill depriving his Highness, his family and relations, including the ladies, of all immunities and rights which had been secured to them by Treaties, by pledges from successive Governors-General, and by no less than four Acts of Council.”

At this period Lord Dalhousie’s influence with the Home Government was unbounded; his word was law. The Nawab’s remonstrances were of no avail. The Court of Directors sanctioned all Lord Dalhousie’s proposals except that of abolishing the salute,—“it appeared sufficient that the number of guns be altered from nineteen to thirteen,”—and that of reducing his Highness’s income.

In 1859, as a reward for the Nawab’s “numerous and valuable services rendered to the British Government

during the Sonthal rebellion in 1855, and at the more serious crisis which followed, the mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857," the public honours due to his Highness were replaced on their former scale, and the restrictions and deprivations imposed by Lord Dalhousie were wholly removed; but the immunity from certain legal processes previously enjoyed by the Nawab and the ladies of his family was not restored, the Governor-General considering that such a step would have "undesirable consequences", and would not be so advantageous to the Nawab as he supposed. In Lord Canning's letter, announcing the good news, the Nawab was assured that the Minute on the subject by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, "recorded in the archives of the Government, will serve as a perpetual remembrance of your Highness's active and zealous support, and of the firm friendship which exists between your Highness and the British Government".\*

The Nawab having now been reinstated very much on the old footing, it was, doubtless, expected by the authorities at Calcutta that, under a proper sense of these unexampled concessions, he would rest and be thankful. But the evil effects of an iniquitous act are not so easily dispelled. The Nawab was relieved from the personal indignity and the restraint over his movements ordained by Lord Dalhousie, but the charge of privity to a murder and of harbouring and favouring the murderers, which had been used as the pretext for these penalties, was not withdrawn or modified. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir Frederick Halliday, on whose Minute Lord Canning's measures of recompense were based, had concurred in 1853, as a Member of Council, in Lord Dalhousie's condemnation of the Nawab. He had thus pre-

\* *Return to the House of Lords, Honours and Rewards to Native Princes* (77 of 1860), p. 163.

judged the case, and was not prepared to admit in 1859 that his condemnation had been hasty and ill-founded.

Mr. Grant Duff, the Under Secretary of State for India, in the debate on Mr. Havilland Burke's motion on the 4th July, 1871, does, indeed, so far modify the original charge as to say that "*the Court of Directors* never accused the Nawab of having been actually an accomplice in the murder. What they accused him of"—continued the honourable gentleman, "was only of having falsely stated to the Governor-General's Agent that he had dismissed from his service the persons who had committed the murder, and having afterwards extended marked and especial favour to one, at least, of these persons". And the Under Secretary suggests that "the whole story of his" (the Nawab's) "misconduct would have been utterly forgotten if he had not gone out of his way to revive it".

But the Agent to the Governor-General in 1858, under Lord Canning's Government,—still, happily, living to answer for himself,—could see nothing of that "misconduct", which the Under Secretary considers himself justified in imputing.

General Colin Mackenzie, in that *Narrative of Nizamut Affairs* already cited, declares that "the Nawab Nazim's explanation bears truth on the face of it;" and thus dismisses the incident on which the Under Secretary,—following, as he says, the Court of Directors' despatch of 1854,—founds the charge of making a false statement, to which the accusation against the Nawab is now reduced.

"His Highness seems at first to have understood that the Governor-General had ordered the dismissal of the eunuchs, though nothing is said of this in Lord Dalhousie's letter, but hearing nothing of the matter during an interval of four months, and having information that the affair had been referred to the Court of Directors, he thought they never would sanction such an injustice as punishing men for a crime of which they had been acquitted, nor such an interference with his own domestic arrange-

ments, and therefore instead of depriving himself wholly of old and favourite attendants, he allowed them to continue among his retinue, although not exercising their functions, until the matter should be finally decided. This turned out a most unfortunate step. The Agent reported that they were still in His Highness's service, and that Aman Ali Khan had resumed his duties."

Lord Dalhousie declared the charge against the Nawab to be much aggravated by this "unfortunate step", but he never reduced the charge to that of a mere false statement. And if the Court of Directors, as Mr. Grant Duff states, "put the most lenient construction possible" on the Nawab's acts or omissions, they were certainly not very lenient in the penalties they sanctioned and confirmed, and which were enforced for six years. If anyone, therefore, will try to place himself in the position of the Nawab,—or to adopt, for the moment, the conclusions formed by General Colin Mackenzie in 1858, after a careful review of the whole case,—it will be easily understood how his Highness, conscious of his innocence and of the undeserved sentence passed on him, should not regard the remission of the indignities and deprivations under which he had suffered quite as a reward, but rather as a partial reparation, and an imperfect reinstatement.

Some of the Nawab's occasional expenses had been, by one of the penal conditions of 1854 and during their continuance, thrown upon his personal allowance, instead of being defrayed, according to the long established practice, from the Nizamut Fund; and, by one of the restorative conditions of 1859, the usual payments were to be made from the Fund, when required on future occasions. But the more extensive questions, which had long been in dispute, as to the real ownership of that Fund, and as to the right of the Nawab Nazim to be consulted in its investment and disbursement, were still left open and unsettled. The Nizamut Fund was formed by deductions

and savings from the stipend allotted to the Nawab, under arrangements made from time to time with his predecessors, and the accumulations were annually increasing. Although this Fund had been constantly pronounced by the Government of India and by the Court of Directors, *not* to be “public money”, to be “the inalienable property of the Nizamut,” and “a part of the assignment secured by Treaty to the family”, Lord Dalhousie had evinced an intention of disregarding the terms of the various trusts, and of treating the Fund as if it were entirely at the disposal of Government.

But worse remained behind. From the very terms in which the Court of Directors had negatived one of the proposed measures against the Nawab, there appeared reason to suspect that something still more harsh and hostile had been recommended by Lord Dalhousie. The Court of Directors would not reduce the Nawab’s income,—they would not interfere with the Nizamut stipend, “*during his Highness’s life-time*”, thus causing the most serious alarm as to what they might be disposed to do after his demise. In short, the fact became known, (formally stated in General Colin Mackenzie’s *Narrative*, and since published in several official Papers,) that the Nawab’s alleged misconduct had been turned to account by Lord Dalhousie for the furtherance of his policy—avowed in 1848,—of losing no “such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory *or revenue* as may from time to time present themselves”, and of obtaining “ultimate reversions of revenue into the general exchequer of India”,\*—that in his Minutes and despatches on the subject the Governor-General had recorded his opinion that the Nawab had “no right or title whatever to any allowance by treaty or compact, or by virtue of any agreement”, but that he and

\* *Post*, p. 53.

his predecessors had hitherto received their stipend "of the free grace and favour of the British Government." The future existence of the family was threatened. All security for their dignities and possessions was denied.

Alarmed by these ominous intimations and still more portentous rumours, but encouraged by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, and by the favourable change in the aspect of our Government, the Nawab, having got his inch in 1859, has ever since continued asking for his ell in several memorials to the Government of India and to the Secretary of State. After a great deal of correspondence, a crisis was reached in a despatch from the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood (now Lord Halifax) dated the 17th of June, 1864, an "Extract" from which was forwarded for the information of his Highness the Nawab Nazim. This "Extract" is certified as a "true copy" by no less than three officials,—by "C. U. Aitchison, Under Secretary to the Government of India," by "Maurice Power, Assistant in charge of office on tour", and by "W. B. Buckle, Agent to the Governor-General",—showing, we may presume, the stages by which it was transmitted to the hands of the Nawab Nazim. At each stage the "Extract" was, it would appear, copied, but at which of them it was manipulated so as to render it anything but a "true copy", does not appear. The despatch in its complete form (as in the *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 371 of 1870,) consists of fourteen paragraphs. After mentioning the "long series of official papers" from the Government of India, and the memorials received from the Nawab, the Secretary of State proceeds to "review all the circumstances of his Highness's position." There are many historical inaccuracies in the sketch of the relations between the East India Company and the Nawab's predecessors which occupies paragraphs 4 and 5 of the de-

spatch ; but although the opinion is expressed, as a matter of abstract argument, that “the family of the Nawab Nazim of Bengal have, under the Firman of Shah Allum, no claim upon the British Government”, and that “under the Treaties” concluded with his ancestors, “the Nawab Nazim of Bengal has no acquired rights,” the practical conclusion laid down in paragraph 6—duly communicated to the Nawab in the “Extract,”—is of the most reassuring nature.

“In 1772, by an order of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, passed on a review of the proceedings of the Bengal Government upon the accession of Moobaruk-ood-Dowlah, and of the Treaty concluded with him by the Indian Government, the stipend of the Nawab Nazim was fixed at the annual amount of 16 lacs of rupees. No treaties of a later date than 1770 were entered into with the descendants of Meer Jaffier, but, on the occasion of each succession, the member of the House entitled to succeed by Mahomedan Law has been recognised by the British Government as Nawab Nazim, and the stipend of 16 lacs of rupees has continued to be appropriated to the benefit of the Nazim and other members of the family. By whatsoever terms, strictly defined, the Nawab Nazim may hold the titles and privileges which he now enjoys, it is obvious to me that they could not be interfered with or altered, during good conduct, without a violation of the spirit, at least, of the assurances which have been given to him by our Government, and a departure from the whole tenure of our transactions with him during a long course of years. I perceive with satisfaction, therefore, that your Government have no intention of disturbing subsisting arrangements for the pecuniary provision of the Nawab Nazim and his family, and the maintenance of the titular dignity of his Highness”.\*

In the Extract furnished to the Nawab there is a hiatus, marked by asterisks, between paragraphs 11 and 13; and though any reservation in communicating a despatch of this kind may have raised some anxiety in the minds of those interested, no one could have been prepared for the eventual disclosure that the confidence created by paragraph 6 was proved to be false by para-

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 4.

graph 12,—that the promises apparently made to the Nawab Nazim and his family in the paragraph communicated, were made of no effect in the paragraph reserved. The omitted passage runs as follows :—

“ 12. It appears to have been the intention of your Government to leave the adjustment of future relations with the family of the Nawab Nazim until the necessity shall actually arise. But I am of opinion that it is advisable that the future position of the Nawab Nazim’s sons should be fixed and defined with as little delay as possible, in order that the young men may be made acquainted with the status which they are to hold after the death of the present Nawab whilst they are yet sufficiently young to form habits adapted to the circumstances in which they may be placed. With reference to this consideration, Her Majesty’s Government desire to be put in possession of the views of your Excellency in Council with respect to the future provision to be made for the Nazim’s family. Your Excellency is aware that this Government are fully sensible of the inconvenience of perpetuating, in this or in any other family, a line of titled stipendiaries, without power and responsibility, and without salutary employment conducive to their happiness and their respectability. It would seem to be the desire of the Nazim that his sons should be trained to useful occupations, and I should be glad, therefore, to learn from your Excellency’s Government whether, in your opinion any arrangements can be made to place these young noblemen in an honourable position, enabling them to become useful members of society, before they are so moulded to habits of idleness as to render it difficult, if not impossible, to make a favourable impression upon them. It is possible that the accumulations in the Deposit Fund may, in some manner, be so employed as to form, to a certain extent, a permanent endowment for some members of the family, and, at the same time, to supply those incentives to exertion which cannot exist in the case of mere Government stipendiaries.”\*

The omission of this all-important portion of the despatch from the “Extract” for the Nawab’s information was open and undisguised ; and we may fully admit the indispensable discretionary power of withholding from persons interested, or from the general community, any parts of an official document that the Government, from

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 6.

a regard for the public weal, may consider it would be unadvisable to make known.

Although a critical analysis of the language employed in paragraph 6 may show that its letter is not quite irreconcilable with that of paragraph 12, and that its conciliatory spirit is very superficial and indefinite, no impartial reader can, we think, examine the two passages in conjunction without being irresistibly led to the conclusion that the one was expressly written to be shown, and the other not to be shown,—that paragraph 12 announced the real policy, and the course to be pursued at the next demise, while paragraph 6 was carefully worded to keep the present Nawab quiet, and to make things pleasant during his life time.

There was another paragraph in the despatch calculated to make things pleasant for the Nawab, which, however, was withheld from him in the "Extract." Whether this was done at the first stage, in the office of the Secretary to Government, or at the last, in that of the Agent to the Governor-General at Moorshedabad, does not appear, but in either case the reservation was made in an irregular style, quite disentitling the "Extract" to the triple certificate of being a "true copy." Of course this may have been a fortuitous occurrence,—though that is hardly credible,—it may have been the unauthorised act of a subordinate, undertaken either as a volunteer stroke of state-craft, or with transcendental views of clerical symmetry, but the effect is decidedly undignified, and painfully suggestive of deception. The paragraph omitted is numbered 8. But instead of there being any hiatus between 7 and 9 in the "true copy" sent to the Nawab, a paragraph numbered 8 still appears therein,—the real paragraph 7 being, with this object, divided into two parts, numbered 7 and 8.

PARAGRAPH 7 OF SIR CHARLES WOOD'S DESPATCH, DATED  
17TH JUNE, 1864.

*As in the Parliamentary Papers,  
No. 371 of 1870.*

*As subdivided in the "true copy"  
sent for the Nawab's information.*

"7. It appears that the personal allowance of the Nawab Nazim himself is about seven lakhs of rupees, that, from the remaining nine lakhs, provision is made for other members of the family, and that the balance goes to the formation of an accumulating fund, known as the 'Nizamut Deposit Fund'. It is unnecessary to trace further the history of this Fund. Its accumulations, representing, as they do, the unappropriated portions from year to year of the sixteen lakhs stipend, unquestionably belong to the Nazim and his family, and can properly be expended only for their benefit. But this does not confer upon the Nazim himself any right to dispose, or to superintend the disposal, of these balances. This right belongs to the Government, under the conditions upon which the Fund was constituted. It was assumed, in the first instance, mainly for the benefit and protection of the Nazim and his family; and I am of opinion that it is to the advantage of his Highness and his family that this system should be maintained. At the same time, it would seem to be desirable, and I believe that, to some extent, it has been the practice, in past time, for your Government, through the Agent at Moorshedabad, occasionally to consult the Nazim with respect to any extraordinary expenditure from the Nizamut Fund."

"7. It appears that the personal allowance of the Nawab Nazim himself is about seven lakhs of rupees, that, from the remaining nine lakhs, provision is made for the members of the family, and that the balance goes to the formation of an accumulating fund known as the 'Nizamut Deposit Fund'.

"8. It is unnecessary to trace further the history of the Fund. Its accumulations, representing, as they do, the unappropriated portions from year to year, of the sixteen lakhs stipend, unquestionably belong to the Nawab Nazim and his family, and can properly be expended only for their benefit. But this does not confer upon the Nazim himself any right to dispose, or to superintend the disposal, of these balances. This right belongs to the Government under the conditions upon which the Fund was constituted. It was assumed in the first instance mainly for the benefit and protection of the Nazim and his family; and I am of opinion that it is to the advantage of His Highness and his family that this system should be maintained. At the same time it would seem to be desirable, and, I believe, that to some extent, it has been the practice in past time, for your Government, through the Agent at Moorshedabad, occasionally to consult the Nazim with respect to any extraordinary expenditure from the Nizamut Fund."

The real paragraph 8, thus withdrawn from the Nawab's

observation and inquisitiveness, was to the following effect :—

“ 8. It has always been the desire of Her Majesty’s Government that a liberal view should be taken of the claims of the family of the Nazim, in respect to the appropriation of the accumulations in the Deposit Fund to objects calculated to advance their happiness and to support their dignity. To this end, in my Despatch of the 7th of July, 1859, I authorised an advance of four lakhs of rupees from the Deposit Fund for the payment of the Nawab Nazim’s debts, leaving it to the discretion of the Government whether this sum should be a loan, to be repaid by instalments, or a substantive grant for the above purpose. In the same Despatch I requested that the decision upon this point might be communicated to Her Majesty’s Government at the earliest convenience of the Governor-General in Council, and that the money might be paid to the Nawab Nazim without any further delay. But I regret that I have not received from your Government any communication whatsoever on the subject, and I cannot ascertain that the money has ever been advanced in any shape ; I desire, therefore, to be informed whether anything was done in consequence of these instructions.”\*

The claims of the Nazim and his family to the Nizamut Fund having occupied a great space in the discussions which caused the appeal to the Home Government, this paragraph with its “ liberal view ” of the question in general, and the directions for an immediate advance of four lakhs of rupees (£40,000), would have been most gratifying to the Nawab. But apparently the Government at Calcutta considered that the communication of this paragraph would be much too gratifying, and desired to avoid or postpone the advance of four lakhs of rupees, notwithstanding the instructions on that head of the Secretary of State, amounting almost to a positive order. Several years elapsed before it became known to the Nawab Nazim that this advance had been authorised, and if we apply rightly some passages in the speech of Mr. Grant

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), pp. 4, 5.

Duff on the 4th July, 1871, the grant had not been fully disbursed even on that date.\*

The peculiar manner in which paragraph 8 was withdrawn from view, prevented all inquiry on the subject. But the Nawab soon got wind of the far more important paragraph 12, denouncing, in terms equivalent to Red Republican invectives against "an idle and profligate nobility", the very existence of the Nizamut family. The historian of the Sepoy War remarks, with reference to Lord Dalhousie's plan for annexing Kerowlee, which caused a panic throughout the States of Rajpootana, that "it was well known at every Native Court, in every Native bazaar". In such matters there is "no Secret Department".† Perhaps all the secondary and subordinate officials who were cognizant of these denunciations, had not been properly impressed by their superiors with the advisability of keeping things quiet and pleasant during the Nawab's lifetime. Somehow or other the facts leaked out. It became known that the Secretary of State had objected to "*the inconvenience of perpetuating a line of titled stipendiaries*", had declared that the sons of the Nawab Nazim would be placed in altered circumstances "*after the death of the present Nawab*", and had suggested that they should not be "*moulded to habits of idleness*", but "*trained to useful occupations*".‡

As the Secretary of State propounds no scheme for extinguishing or annihilating this "line of titled stipendiaries", it is not easy to imagine how he intends to prevent it from "perpetuating" itself. Nor is it any easier to divine how the "inconvenience" of such a "line" exist-

\* "Then the Government undertook to give him £40,000 to clear off certain debts, if that sum was found necessary. The Government has given him, or is going to give him, the money—£25,000 it has given him, and £15,000 it is going to give him."

† *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. i, p. 96.

‡ *Ante*, p. xiii.

ing can be removed by its comparative impoverishment and degradation. Unless the acquisition of revenue by any means is to over-ride all other considerations, it is difficult to see the advantage of perverting a family of great influence from a state of contented quiescence and harmonious co-operation to a state of morbid activity and discontented opposition.

It is not enough to say in condemnation of the visionary plausibilities brought forward in paragraph 12 of the despatch of 17th June, 1864, that they evince an utter and contemptuous want of sympathy with the class attacked: they betray an utter ignorance of the conditions of Indian society, and of its most energetic and sensitive constituent, Mahomedan society. How did Lord Halifax expect the Princes of the Moorshedabad family to be weaned from what he stigmatises as "habits of idleness", and to be "trained to useful occupations"? To what part of the globe could he refer them for an example? Such efforts of self-denial and self-abasement are not expected of European "Royalties retired from business," whether of ancient or *parvenu* origin,—of a Bonaparte or a Bourbon, a Murat or a Vasa. Oriental Royalties, their followers and adherents, have the same prejudices and pride, and lack the outlets and consolations that are possessed by their Western compeers. The British Government of India opens no road to the honourable ambition of young Nawabs and Rajahs. Mediatised Princes find places in the Army, the diplomatic service and the executive administration of Germany and Austria. There is room for a Saxe-Weimar in our Army, for a Leiningen and a Gleichen in our Navy. The Dukes of Chartres and Penthièvre can serve Republican France. But no son of a Princely line in India, reigning or mediatised, is admitted into the Army or Civil Service of the

Empire, unless he should solicit employment in some inferior situation such as no English gentleman would accept. When the head of one of these families is deprived of the stipend on which he maintains a host of relatives and connections,—and to a somewhat less degree when the stipend is reduced and sub-divided, with the prospect of gradual extinction,—the result must be immediate ruin to many, loss and humiliation to the whole tribe, while the only life of activity to which our Government invites them is one of conspiracy and fanaticism.

As soon as the Nawab Nazim had ascertained beyond the possibility of doubt that it was to a fate like this his family was destined, unless our Government could be induced to reconsider the sentence passed by Lord Dalhousie in 1853, he determined to proceed in person to London,—there, at the foot of the Throne and before the Great Council of the Empire, to ask for inquiry and redress.

The Nawab never did, and does not, claim a sum of more than eighteen millions sterling, exclusive of interest, as a settlement of the arrears and outstanding balances due to the Nizamut. He does *not* ask that the stipend may be raised, either with retrospective or prospective effect, to the amount mentioned in the Treaty of 1770, £318,000, instead of £160,000, the annual sum that has been allotted since the year 1772, and during five successions, for the support of the Nizamut. He did not “assert”—as the Government of India suggested by way of a *reductio ad absurdum* of his case,—“that Her Majesty in the year 1870 ought to reconsider the justice and propriety of the policy of Warren Hastings in 1770, with the view, if it should appear to have been unjust or impolitic, of reestablishing the representative of Meer Jaffier as hereditary Soubadar of Bengal, and of reducing

herself to the position of Dewan.”\* The Nawab has not made the extravagant demands, or preferred the monstrous pretensions that have been ascribed to him, the rumour of which,—not entirely of spontaneous growth,—is known to have raised a prejudice in many minds against his Highness’s case, and to have diverted attention from its real nature and merits.

What the Nawab really does ask is an assurance by the Imperial Government, in any form that may be considered becoming, that the honours and dignities of the Nizamut and Soobahdarry of Bengal are what they were publicly proclaimed to be at his accession,—and at the accession of every one of his predecessors,—“*hereditary honours and dignities.*”† He also asks that the stipend which has been for a century, and during five successions, settled on the Nawab Nazim, shall be pronounced to be what it was declared to be by the Home Government in 1840,—two years after the present Nawab’s accession,—“*the assignment secured by Treaty to the family,*”‡ and shall not be again diminished.

He asks that the Nizamut Fund may be clearly acknowledged to be what it was invariably declared to be until 1853,—when the new doctrines of Lord Dalhousie were propounded,—“*the inalienable property of the Nizamut*”; or, in the words of the Home Government in 1840, “*not ‘public money’, but a part of the assignment secured by Treaty to the Family, which part is allowed to accumulate for its general benefit,*”§ or in the words of the Secretary of State’s despatch of 17th June, 1864, paragraph 8, “*to belong unquestionably to the Nawab Nazim and his family,*” “*to be expended only for their*

\* Despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 29th July, 1870, *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 4.

† *Post*, pp. 17, 18.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 78.

*benefit.*”\* So much being granted, he asks that this Fund may be really maintained and expended for the benefit of the Nawab Nazim and his family, and that it may be not applied, at his demise, to form what is called in paragraph 12 of the same despatch, “a permanent endowment” for his sons and other “members of the family”, —that is to say, a provision on a reduced scale made out of the accumulated savings of the “assignment secured by Treaty”, the assignment being no longer paid. This would really be to apply “the inalienable property of the Nizamut” for the benefit of the British Government.

The Nizamut stipend, instituted in 1765, when, on being invested with the Dewannee or Financial Administration of Bengal, the East India Company became entitled to exercise control over the expenditure, was intended, in the words of the original agreement, to cover the expenses of the Nawab’s “*household, servants,*” and “*retinue*”, and “*the support of his dignity only*”.† It was, therefore, distinctly of the nature of a Civil List, and the argument that has been sometimes brought forward, that the word “Nizamut” means simply “government,” and that those allowances were for the expense of carrying on the administration, falls to the ground at once. No part of the expense of administration was ever paid out of the Nizamut stipend.

After their acquisition of the Dewannee, but more particularly during the minority of two Nawabs in succession, between 1766 and 1782, the East India Company contrived to possess themselves of all the functions of executive administration; the judicial department alone being left under the partial control of the Native Prince until 1793. The Nawab Nazim was thus gradually reduced to the position of a mediatised Sovereign.

\* *Ante*, p. xiv.

† *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), pp. 13, 14; *Post*, p. 27.

During this double minority, also,—by means of two Treaties, and the arbitrary suspension by order of the Court of Directors of one half of the Nawab's allowances during "the nonage" of the younger of these Princes, which suspension was extended indefinitely until it became permanent,—the Nizamut stipend was gradually reduced to the amount at which it has been fixed for the last hundred years, £160,000 per annum.

During this same period of their "nonage", the two minor Nawabs were, by some process of management or guardianship, deprived of large landed estates, the possession of which would for ever have secured the family from being entirely dependent on the honour and forbearance of the stronger party to the Treaty of 1770, and from being stigmatised in 1871 by Mr. Grant Duff, the Under Secretary of State for India, as "titled stipendiaries," "recipients of the bounty of the British Government." The Nizamut stipend, therefore, is not merely a perpetual annuity, settled on a mediatised Princely family in consideration of the loss of their sovereignty, and of great political services rendered to the Imperial Government, but stands also as compensation for the loss of their domains. In consequence of these losses and reductions, the Nawab Nazim has a much smaller income than several noblemen and land-holders in Bengal,—the Rajah of Burdwan, for example, about the richest man in India, —who, nevertheless, would not think of claiming for themselves anything like an equality of rank with the descendant of the rulers of the country and grantors of their estates, and would never address him in writing except in the style of a humble petitioner.

For the whole of the Nizamut stipend of £160,000 the Nawab Nazim is required to grant his acquittance, although only the sum of £70,000 is paid directly to

him,—the rest being apportioned out to other members of the family, or added to the Nizamut Fund. The present Nawab alleges—in pursuance of long-standing claims—that the accumulations of this Fund have been allowed to grow far beyond what was contemplated and stipulated in the several arrangements between his predecessors and the Government of India; that lapsed pensions and allowances of deceased relatives and dependents are constantly being absorbed into the Fund, instead of being restored to the income of the head of the family; that sums from the Fund are applied to purposes foreign to the interests of the Nizamut; and that by these processes a great part of the assignment under treaty is improperly withheld from the Nawab, and a large amount of family property intercepted by the British Government.

But these are points of minor importance, mere details in the inquiry for which the Nawab sues, when compared with the main point of the threatened subjection of his heir, at the next succession, to a very considerable diminution of his prescriptive income, to the total sequestration, however disguised and glorified, of the accumulated family capital, and to the denial of his hereditary rank, with the necessary consequences of social humiliation and heavy loss to the entire family.

In 1869 the Nawab Nazim arrived in London. On the 28th of July in that year he presented his Memorial to the Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll. In conformity with the rule in such cases, the Memorial was sent to the Government of India for their comments and report. A full year and a day elapsed before the opinions of the Governor-General and Council were embodied in a despatch dated the 29th of July, 1870.\* It reached this country of course after the close of the Parliamentary

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 2.

session; and the Duke of Argyll's letter to the Nawab, in reply to his Highness's Memorial, is dated the 23rd of December, 1870.\* This communication from the Secretary of State conveys, in colourless language and with a total avoidance of argumentative exposition, his general concurrence with the views of the despatch of the 17th June, 1864, from Sir Charles Wood, who was then Secretary of State, while the Duke of Argyll was Lord Privy Seal, and who now, as Lord Halifax, holds the Privy Seal in the same Cabinet in which the Duke sits as Secretary of State for India.

The only noteworthy passage in the Duke's letter to the Nawab is his Grace's declaration that "having deliberately considered the circumstances of the treaties" between his "Highness's predecessors on the one side and the British Government on the other", he "can come to no other conclusion than that they were *not of an hereditary nature*",—a conclusion which, even if it were sound and tenable, entirely passes by the prescriptive claims of the Nizamut, proved and displayed by the uniform and reiterated statements and acts of all British authorities, at home and in India, for a hundred years, and which, in the absence of any Treaty, would amply suffice to establish the hereditary nature of the Nawab's dignity and revenue.

But if the Duke's letter calls for no critical remark, confined as it is to a pointless declaration of adherence to previous official proceedings, the same cannot be said of the positions assumed in the House of Commons by the Under-Secretary of State on the 4th July, 1871, when after an interval of two years—caused, as we have seen, by no delay on the Nawab's part,—the motion for a Select Committee to inquire into the Treaties between

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 8.

the East India Company and the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, was introduced by Mr. Haviland Burke. No one on that occasion can have been prepared for the offensive weapons produced and the new ground occupied by Mr. Grant Duff. We shall endeavour to show in the following pages that these newly invented weapons of offence are by no means arms of precision, and that, however well calculated to inflict pain, their effect cannot be fatal. We shall endeavour to show that the new ground occupied is false and treacherous, and that although for once a lightly equipped partisan may skim over the surface, it will not bear even his weight a second time.

When a professed judge has adopted the style and tactics of a partisan, the appellant may be excused, and his cause ought to suffer no prejudice, if he calls in the aid of a professed advocate.\* The only tribunal before which the appeal can be heard is by no means generally well instructed in Indian affairs. It will be one of our objects to expose the flagrant misdirection of the tribunal,

\* Although I have no objection to the character of advocate in this case, —one of a class especially needing advocacy, and accepted for advocacy or advice by some of the most eminent living judges and counsel,—let me observe that the principles and political considerations on which my arguments proceed are not the growth of the present occasion, but have been brought forward by me, in season and out of season,—officially, more strongly than such humble places as I filled usually permit, officiously, by such literary means as were available,—for more than fifteen years; and that I did not want a rebellion to teach them to me; that in 1856 I placed on official record the cruel results of disinheriting the heir of the Rajah of Nagpore; that in 1857, under very peculiar circumstances, I addressed a refutation of Lord Dalhousie's novel doctrine of "Lapse", as applied in the recent annexations of Nagpore and Jhansi, directly to Lord Canning, and suggested the reconstitution of the former Native State. In April 1861, an article from my pen (reprinted in 1864 in *The Empire in India*), recommended the very policy towards Mysore,—the maintenance of the State under an adopted heir, and the gradual restoration of Native agency,—which in 1867 was ordered by the Secretary of State to be carried out in every particular.—E. B.

at the first hearing last year, by the official representative of the Imperial Government, who would naturally be expected and trusted to give full and accurate information as to the facts of the case, and its political and social bearings.

What is to become of this expectation and trust, what can be thought of the merits of the official answer, when it appears that Mr. Grant Duff's contemptuous assertions, that "the Nawab Nazim of Bengal is no Prince", that "his father was no Prince", that "his grandfather was no Prince", that "none of his predecessors have been Indian Princes", constitute an irreconcilable defiance of history, of law, and of the innumerable declarations and uniform practice of our Government down to the present day? What will be thought of the inherent strength of the official case, when Mr. Grant Duff's bold assertion that the Treaty of 1770 between the East India Company and the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, "was never ratified by the proper authority, and never acted on during the whole of the life of the person to whose life it exclusively applied," appears to be totally without foundation,—when it is proved that it *was* "ratified by the proper authority"; that the Court of Directors (to whose arbitrary action the Under Secretary most inaccurately refers,) approved and confirmed the Treaty; that it was "acted on" in every respect, without a jot or tittle of deduction, during two years of the life of the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, and, saving the arbitrary and professedly temporary modification of one of its provisions, during the whole of his life; and that so far from this Treaty being "exclusively applied" to the life of that Nawab, it was to be "inviolably observed for ever", and has been repeatedly and continuously recognised as a still subsisting Treaty during the life of every successor to the Nizamut, including the present Nawab?

What can be thought of the competence of Mr. Grant Duff to grasp the complex problem of the social and sectarian forces at work in India, when he is found speaking of the people of Bengal as "a Hindoo population,"\* totally ignoring the Mussulman inhabitants, who form a considerable part of the population, and who far surpass all other sects and classes in average intelligence and spirit, in social organisation and political capacity?

The Under Secretary's failure to appreciate the importance of the Mussulman community as a constituent in the population of Bengal,—his utter inability to realise the scene of action, the plot of the drama, or the places of the several performers,—tempt us to hazard a conjecture that he must have been tutored in his own part by some one accepted at the India Office as an expert in Bengal affairs. Keeping in view the high probability of such instruction, it is necessary to recollect that in the whole matter of the Nawab's appeal the original respondent is the provincial Government of Bengal, under which the immediate supervision of Nizamut affairs has always been left; and that the functionaries of that Province have evinced on every possible occasion, from the first establishment of British power down to the present day, the most marvellous lack of insight into Mahomedan opinion and feeling, and into the fluctuations and progress of the Mahomedan movement. It matters not whether this blindness is altogether an incurable defect, or whether,—as we are inclined to think,—it arises from that haughty and unsympathetic indifference to every social and spiritual force of purely Native growth, which a true statesman might be expected to overcome, but which has always been the weakness of our system in India, hardly less prevalent among the supreme than

\* *Post*, p. 64.

among the subordinate authorities, most conspicuous at the great centres of British power, and preeminently so at Calcutta.

At Calcutta, where everything is bedaubed with a thin wash of European culture,—where gas-lamps and an Italian Opera House, daily newspapers and an Art Union, attest the progress of humanity, where the palanquin has given place to the brougham, and Baboos in patent-leather boots display their enlightenment by eating beef-steaks and drinking bottled porter,—the highly placed English officials of long service and great experience become quite unable to realise the possibility of any attack on Government within the Regulation Provinces more formidable than an ‘indignation’ meeting at the Town Hall, a memorial from the British Indian Association, or an article in the *Hindoo Patriot*. The same arrogant confidence has always been equally characteristic of the Viceregal Cabinet and Secretariat, and of the local Government of Bengal, in ordinary times, and has been very rapidly recovered after any shock or convulsion.

It is well known that at the outbreak of the Rebellion of 1857, the only man in Lord Canning’s Council who perceived the dangerous crisis that had arrived, who forecast the magnitude of the struggle, and insisted that there must be no trifling with it, was General Sir John Low. The great Civilians were all for adhering to the strict forms of law. At first they would not believe that the contagion would spread through the army,—“they laid it down as a maxim that no corps ever mutinied which was properly commanded”.\* When the defection of seventy Regiments overturned that theory, they maintained that no civil district had risen, would or could rise

\* *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier (1857), p. 175.

in revolt, or that any part of the civil population could join or sympathise with the Sepoys, for this was a purely military mutiny. The extended area of insurrection soon upset this theory also; but the old colleagues and supporters of Lord Dalhousie stuck to it as long as they could.

In the extract already given from Sir John Kaye's history we are told that the great danger of a Mahomedan rising in Bengal—more particularly if it could start from Moorshedabad as a centre, with the ostensible countenance of the Nawab,—was “very patent to the understanding of our enemies”, but that “no thoughts of this kind disturbed the minds of our people”.\*

In the same beautiful spirit of undisturbed tranquillity and uninquiring confidence, Mr. (now Sir Frederick) Halliday, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, totally disapproved and denounced the precautionary measures taken in the middle of June, 1857,—the highest crisis of the insurrectionary spirit,—by Mr. William Tayler, Commissioner of Patna, to frustrate the machinations of Wahabee conspirators.

In order fully to appreciate what the situation was, it must be understood that Mr. Tayler was the responsible executive authority in the Province of Behar, with a population of several millions, composed of Hindoo tribes far more sturdy and turbulent than those of the Lower Districts of Bengal, and that the city of Patna, 380 miles from Calcutta, contains about 300,000 inhabitants, at least one-third being Mahomedan.

Acting on good information which none but a ruler who was popular, genial, and accessible, as well as able, would have been likely to procure, and the accuracy of which has been marvellously proved by events long sub-

\* *Ante*, p. iv.

sequent, Mr. Tayler quietly arrested and kept in close but honourable custody the leaders of the Wahabee sect, among whom was a person of considerable wealth and influence in the city of Patna, Moulavee Ahmed-oolla. Immediately on receiving intelligence of this step, the Lieutenant-Governor sent Mr. Tayler a curt requisition for copies of the documents on which he had based the arrest of the principal "*Wahabee gentlemen*". Mr. Halliday did not officially or openly condemn this measure at the time, nor directly interfere with Mr. Tayler's orders. But his constant warnings and exhortations to do nothing "harsh or illegal", and to take care not to overstep the law; his complimentary designation of the "*Wahabee gentlemen*"; his extraordinary opinion, publicly recorded, that it was "*inconceivable the Sepoys at Dinapore*" (ten miles from Patna) "*should mutiny*", which, however, they did on the 23rd July, and that he "*could not believe we were in any danger at Patna*"; are sufficient to show the justice of our allegation, that the Bengal authorities, even at the moment of greatest peril, have ever manifested an ignorant contempt for the social and spiritual forces that sway the masses around them.

Mr. Tayler checked and confounded the Wahabee designs until military operations rendered their immediate renewal hopeless; he saved our Government from an immeasurable aggravation of its difficulties, but he did not duly revere those in the brotherhood of the Bengal Civil Service who had attained to a higher step in the hierarchy. He observed, inquired, thought and acted promptly, but in an unheard-of predicament some of his acts were unprecedented and officially irregular. He was removed from Patna; and, being a man of high courage and independent spirit, the treatment he received from Government,—for, of course the Lieutenant-Governor's authority was supported,—drove him from the service.

Mr. Tayler's successor at Patna, carefully instructed to repair all breaches in the Regulations, at once released the "Wahabee gentlemen" from their confinement, received Moulavee Ahmed-oollah, their chief, with open arms, condoled with him on his unmerited sufferings, and congratulated him on his emancipation. The new Commissioner also reported, in words expressly approved by the Lieutenant-Governor,—

"With regard to the Wahabees, it is only necessary to say that there is not the slightest proof that any danger was to be apprehended from this sect."

"Mr. Tayler, indeed, talks of the men he arrested as the Wahabee leaders, but they were book-men, and had the sect been inclined to fight they would assuredly have selected other leaders."

"Without positively affirming the fact, I confess a doubt has often occurred to me whether Mr. Tayler was not worked upon to arrest the Wahabees, simply in order to get out of the way men who were likely to interfere with the plans of the conspirators. There is at least, as will be seen, some grounds for this hypothesis. There is none for attributing seditious designs to the Wahabees."

Mr. Tayler and his principal Mussulman subordinate, Mowla Buksh,—the confidence placed in whom proves that the Commissioner had no prejudice against Mahomedans,—having been removed from Patna, the much-injured Wahabees were taken into high favour. As if to demonstrate the absurdity of all suspicions against these harmless "book-men", their leader, that respectable "Wahabee gentleman", Moulavee Ahmed-oollah, was placed on the Committee of Public Instruction at Patna, where he sat for several years with the Commissioner, Collector, Civil Surgeon, and other English officials. He was also made an Assessor of Income Tax. These two appointments, giving him constant access to the local authorities, and showing how well he stood with them, were calculated very much to strengthen his position. Had not

Wahabee influence reached far beyond the limits of the Bengal Presidency, it might apparently have continued to spread and work, unseen and unchecked, recruiting its followers and over-awing its opponents, until the supreme opportunity arrived. But the very extent of its operations led to the detection of its leaders.

In 1863 Moulavee Ahmed-oollah had the honour of being presented to the Viceroy of India in the reception-hall of Belvedere House at Calcutta. In 1864 he was transported for life to the Andaman Islands.

Seven years had scarcely elapsed since Mr. Tayler was removed from Patna, condemned as having "caused general scandal and discontent" by his administration, particularly by that act of wanton oppression against those inoffensive and loyal subjects, the "Wahabee gentlemen",—seven years had scarcely elapsed since Mr. Halliday, the Lieutenant-Governor, sent an official letter containing high praise of the "Wahabee gentlemen" to the public journals, and had it placed on record in every Commissioner's office in Bengal,—when a police-officer from the Punjaub arrived at Patna, apprehended Moulavee Ahmed-oollah and his brother Yahiya Ali, searched their houses, and carried them off to be tried for their lives on several charges of treason.

For immediately after the costly and bloody Umbeyla campaign of 1863, under General Sir Neville Chamberlain, against the Wahabee fanatics of Sittana, judicial investigations clearly established the fact that the hostile colony beyond the North-Western *corner* of the Punjaub frontier was recruited and subsidised from the British Provinces of Bengal and Hindostan, that Patna had been for many years the head-quarters, arsenal, and bank, the very centre and hot-bed of this fanatical and treasonable organisation; and that those innocent "book-men",

Moulavee Ahmed-oolla and his brother Yahiya Ali, were its leading spirits and most active supporters, incessantly preaching a Jihād or religious war against the British Government, deputing emissaries throughout Bengal to promote the enterprise, and forwarding men, money, and arms to the stronghold of the brigands beyond our frontier. They were condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted to transportation for life.

Immediately after the conviction of Moulavee Ahmed-oolla, the life of the Judge of Patna, Mr. Ainslie, who had tried the case, was attempted by a Mahomedan, who, after being found guilty in the local court, was acquitted by the appellate tribunal on the ground of insanity. The murderous assault failed, and the prosecution of the assailant failed also. It has been suspected that if he was mad, there was some method in his madness.

The suspicion that there is some method in such madness, cannot but become still stronger when the circumstances of two similar acts that have been perpetrated within the last year,—with no failure, alas! in either instance,—are duly considered. Two noble victims have fallen before the knife of the assassin, and in each case there was that same apparent absence of motive for the crime which gave plausibility to the plea of insanity in the case of unsuccessful assault on the Judge of Patna. The fact that he had just convicted and sentenced Moulavee Ahmed-oolla, was at the time scarcely noted.

In consequence of fresh information from the Punjaub and North-West Provinces, inquiries into the Wahabee conspiracy and *propaganda* were pursued with augmented energy in 1869 and 1870. Several persons allied by relationship or close business connections with the “head centres” of Wahabeeism at Patna, were apprehended,—two of higher position and greater wealth than the others

being kept in jail for more than a year by a special process, very seldom put in force, a simple warrant of detention under the seal and sign manual of the Viceroy himself. These persons applied to the High Court of Calcutta for a writ of *habeas corpus*. After long argument this application and several others made on their behalf, were rejected by Mr. Justice Norman. The same Judge was expected to preside, as Acting Chief Justice, when their appeal from the verdict and sentence of the Sessions Court on their trial came up for hearing. On the threshold of the High Court, where the Wahabee conspirators would have been brought for judgment before him, Chief Justice Norman was struck down in open day. The assassin, having in all probability heard something, or having been instructed, as to the escape of the criminal on a previous occasion, feigned insanity. That expedient proving useless, he died and made no sign.

Lord Mayo was the Viceroy who instituted and carried on with unprecedented vigour, the renewed inquisition into the doings of the Wahabee confederacy. By a strange fatality he visits the very place to which Moulavee Ahmed-oolla and the other convicted leaders of that confederacy were transported, and where they are known to have been allowed to hold communication with a large number of other prisoners, and to maintain a correspondence with their brethren and co-religionists at home. It may not be clear whether they had notice of the intended visit, or not, though the necessary preparations in the settlement must have told them; but the broad facts at least are certain, that their arch-enemy, the highest embodiment of the great Infidel Power possessing India, who had even put forth his personal prerogative for the arrest and detention of the elect, comes to the Andaman Islands, where these fanatics are kept under very loose

discipline, and the knife of an assassin once more strikes down the most exalted person within reach, the person above all others whom the Wahabees had reason to hate. That may be a merely fortuitous concurrence of circumstances. Here are three murderous assaults by Mahomedans on high English officials. In not one of these cases is there any trace of private vengeance to be gratified, or of personal rancour against the intended victim. The strange points of agreement between these three outrages, of which one only failed in its fatal object, and their apparent coincidence in time and place with the trial and punishment of certain Wahabee traitors, may be quite accidental and really insignificant; but we are certainly not going to be brought over to that opinion by any assurances from the very highest officials at Calcutta, or from the most experienced and distinguished advisers of the Crown in London who have been transplanted from Calcutta. We have had too much proof of the arrogant apathy and blind self-complacency that have long prevailed in that quarter, to look there for an intelligent, patient, and tolerant appreciation of what is bad, or of what is good, in any one of the religious and social movements that are stirring the depths of the Indian population. They care for none of these things, and therefore they have never known anything about them, until some paroxysm has revealed their existence. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who in 1857 "could not believe we were in any danger at Patna", who considered that there were no "grounds for attributing seditious designs to the Wahabees", and "not the slightest proof that any danger was to be apprehended from this sect",\* who evinced so much pity and sympathy for the harmless "book-men" cruelly confined on suspicion by Commissioner Tayler,

\* *Ante*, pp. xxx, xxxi.

and who gave them public favour and confidence while they were actually engaged in those hostile and treasonable operations against the British Government for which they were eventually transported to the Andaman Islands, —was the same Lieutenant-Governor who in 1853 concurred as Councillor in Lord Dalhousie's persecution of the Nawab Nazim for imaginary misconduct. Very highly, therefore, as any one may estimate the services and reputation of Sir Frederick Halliday, who is now a Member of the Secretary of State's Council, we must urge that in this particular matter of the Nawab Nazim's claims, his opinion can hardly be accepted as an unbiassed one, and that in the general matter of Mahomedanism in India, and of the policy to be pursued for the guidance and control of the Mahomedan movement, his opinion can scarcely be considered as of any value at all. We should say the same of any other permanent official or Councillor at the India Office, who has been trained amidst the narrow prejudices and odious exclusiveness of Bengal Civilianism. And therefore we are not in the least surprised that Mr. Grant Duff was so badly instructed.

A few sentences from the recently recorded views of two eminent men, both of whom have had a more extensive and varied experience of Indian life than falls to the lot of most public servants, and whose opportunities of inquiry and observation have not been confined to the scenes of their military achievements, will afford a brief but sufficient testimony that this is not a period of general contentment and stagnation in India, but that it is a period of political stir and intellectual unrest, and that, among other symptoms of that unrest, there is a widely-spread Mahomedan movement in progress, which deserves to be studied and understood. The late Commander-in-Chief of India, Lord Sandhurst, in a Minute dated the

9th September, 1870, after speaking of "many great changes", which have "tended to disturb and perplex, not only the Native soldiers themselves, but all that part of the population directly or indirectly connected with them", and of the possibilities of a "time of disorder", and of "embodied insurrection", says :—

"Our whole experience of India should warn us that we cannot always depend upon tranquillity ; that disturbances arise when they are least expected ; and, when they commence at one point, unless immediately checked, they are sure to be followed at others."\*

The present Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Napier of Magdala, in a Minute dated 14th November, 1870, warns us emphatically not to be too confident in our inherent strength :—

"In looking to our general position in India, I cannot find ground for believing that we may neglect any means of maintaining our supremacy, or disarm, without risk, in a fancied security. It appears to me that we never had less hold on the affections of the people than at the present.

"The remembrance of the benefits which we conferred on the people of the parts of India which we relieved from oppression and misrule, has passed away with the people of those days ; the present generation only consider their present restraints and the obligations imposed on them ; and the more educated and ambitious look for a larger share of places of influence and emolument than they now possess.

"The Mahomedan movement, though the scope of its objects and intentions has not been fully brought to light, shows a much wider extent and combination than we have hitherto appreciated."†

It might be thought, to say the least, very doubtful whether the Mahomedan movement can be mitigated or managed by persecuting the Conservative leaders of Mahomedan society.

Mr. Grant Duff,—badly instructed, as we said before,—

\* *Papers, Indian Military Expenditure* (467 of 1871), p. 349.

† *Ibid.*, p. 371.

seems to know nothing of the Mussulman community in Bengal, and places the supposed interests of "a Hindoo population" in direct antagonism with those of "a Mahomedan family". In protesting against the continuance of the large assignment of public revenue to the Nizamut after the demise of the present Nawab, the Under Secretary professes to speak on behalf of "the tax-payers", the people of India. Any professions of a regard for economy may be received thankfully, if not with great confidence, from the official spokesman of the most extravagant Government in the world. But after all there is not much in what he said on this point. The only question is whether the Nizamut stipend is hereditary or not. Of course by the repudiation or reduction of any annual charge on the revenue,—the interest on public debt, for example,—there is an apparent gain for the Government and the taxpayer. The same may be said of annexations of territory, the confiscation of estates and personal property. But the gain is very often merely apparent and utterly fallacious. The only question worth asking is whether the proposed acquisition or resumption is just or not. All our Indian experience hitherto shows that whatever revenue we have acquired by an illegitimate process we have always had to expend, and more too, in establishments. Moral force and willing allegiance being lost or impaired, must be replaced by physical force. A British garrison costs more than a British Resident.

It may well be doubted whether either the Bonaparte family or the French tax-payers have gained anything—or ever could have gained anything, if the Second Empire had lasted,—by the confiscation of the Orleans property.

If Mr. Grant Duff can devise no more effectual means for improving the financial condition of India, and for

making our Government popular with the tax-payers, than that of impoverishing the great political stipendiaries, he will never make a name as an Indian statesman. Neither popularity nor a balance is to be got in that way. That way madness lies.

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## THE BENGAL REVERSION.

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BURIED in a confused mass of official documents—a few needles in a huge bin of chaff,—the points of the case of the Nawab Nazim of Bengal may well have eluded the search of many who really sought the truth of the matter. As to the great majority of public men, among the hundred subjects that are daily contending for their attention, it is difficult to conceive of any one that can appear, *primâ facie*, more uninteresting or less urgent. It is not too much to say that there is a general aversion to Indian affairs, as being peculiarly unintelligible and having no direct bearing on the interests of constituencies, and of the immediate circles within which the Members of both Houses of Parliament live and move and have their being and business. And this general aversion very naturally tends to become special, when the Indian affair in question presents itself in the form of a personal grievance, and is depicted by those responsible Ministers and officials who ought to know all about it, as merely the discontented demand of a great stipendiary for some additional emoluments and privileges, “not only far greater in degree, but totally different in kind”—in the words of Mr. Grant Duff, the Under Secretary of State for India,\*—from what he has hitherto enjoyed.

If this were really a fair epitome of the Nawab's claims, —confessedly incapable, as they are, of prosecution or realisation by any legal process,—it would be hopeless to try to get a hearing for them by any statesman or any political critic whose help would be valuable. But it is by no means a fair epitome of the question.

The Nawab does not, in fact, claim anything for him-

\* Speech in the House of Commons, 4th July, 1871.

self or for his descendants, "greater in degree," or "different in kind," from what he now possesses. The question, from his point of view, is whether on his decease the dignity and the endowment settled on his family by treaty, shall be lowered and lessened in a very great degree, and the existing securities for their continuance formally disavowed and destroyed,—whether his son and successor shall be reduced to a mere stipendiary, invested, perhaps, with some new title of nobility, but degraded from his hereditary rank.

The question for the statesman, in office or in opposition, who takes, or has taken, or aspires to take, a part in ruling the Empire, is whether it is worth while, for the sake of an insignificant pecuniary saving, to violate a most conspicuous engagement, thereby awakening throughout India alarming recollections that had almost been set at rest, shaking general confidence in British good faith, and encouraging a spirit of lawlessness and fanaticism.

The question for the practical as well as for the critical politician, wherever his work may lie,—in Parliament, in the press or in party management, is this,—whether the rapacious policy, from which the late Lord Dalhousie's name will be for ever inseparable, and which has been dormant for some years, is to be insidiously revived, so as to form the starting-point and precedent for a new series of confiscations.

In the interval of about three years immediately following the mutinies and rebellion of 1857, during which Indian affairs occupied an unusual space in public attention and underwent a thorough discussion, one principle for the future government of our great Eastern Empire seemed to have got hold of the national conscience,—that the levelling system of grasping by every doubtful pretext and pretence at opportunities of appropriating estates and revenue, to the detriment and ruin of the heads of Native society, should cease. And this principle was apparently accepted by nearly all statesmen of eminence, without distinction of party, who were not themselves officially implicated in the process of disinheritance and forfeiture.

Many remarkable speeches by leading men in both Houses of Parliament, and many public measures, contributed in that interval of about three years to the general impression in India that the Government would henceforward maintain a restorative and conservative policy in their dealings with Native Princes.

On the 2nd August, 1858, the great statute was passed whereby the Queen assumed the direct administration of her Oriental dominions. On the 1st of the ensuing November the Royal Proclamation was issued from Allahabad by her Majesty's first Viceroy, Earl Canning, and was published on the same day in every city and large station of India. The Sovereign of the British Empire spoke face to face for the first time with her Indian Allies, feudatories and subjects. No document published by the British Government in India has ever produced so profound a sensation. Appearing in the hour of strength and triumph, breathing words of mercy and benevolence where vengeance and mistrust might have been expected, this Proclamation gave with no uncertain sound the true ring of Royal magnanimity.

But more especially, in consequence of the following weighty assurances, the Queen's Proclamation was hailed as a solemn pledge of security in the future for the great representative families of every tribe and creed, so many of whom had fallen from their high estate under the policy of Lord Dalhousie's administration.

"We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable the East India Company, are by Us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and We look for the like observance on their part.

"We desire no extension of Our present territorial possessions; and, while we will permit no aggression upon Our dominions or Our rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as Our own."

A copy of this Royal Proclamation was officially furnished to his Highness the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Behar and Orissa.

In Lord Canning's despatch to the Secretary of State,

dated 30th April 1860, commonly called the Adoption Despatch, the unfounded prerogative of "Lapse" was expressly surrendered, which had been the most fatal weapon in Lord Dalhousie's armoury; and repeated admissions were therein made, in contravention of the doctrine recently held as orthodox at Calcutta, to the effect that "the safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well affected to us," and that it must always be advisable to "treat the Chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity". Two remarkable passages may well be quoted here.

"Notwithstanding the greater purity and enlightenment of our administration, its higher tone, and its surer promise of future benefit to the people, as compared with any Native Government, I still think that we have before us a higher and more pressing duty than that of extending our direct rule, and that our first care should be to strengthen that rule within its present limits, and to secure for our general supremacy the contented acquiescence and respect of all who are subjected to it.

"Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards Native States."

Sir Charles Wood, in his reply of the 26th of July, 1860, to Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch, says:—

"In the sentiments expressed in your Excellency's letter of the 30th of April, I entirely concur. It is not by the extension of our Empire that its permanence is to be secured, but by the character of British rule in the territories already committed to our care, and by practically demonstrating that we are as willing to respect the rights of others as we are capable of maintaining our own."

Now it is very true that in the complete or partial resumption of the revenue assigned under Treaty to the Nawab Nazim, and the extinction of his titular dignity, there would be no territorial extension of the Empire. It would be a confiscation of income, not of land, a reduction of Princely rank, not of sovereign power. But at the same time, it appears very doubtful whether "the character of British rule" would be exalted by such a measure, or

whether it would amount to a "practical demonstration" that "we are as willing to respect the rights of others as we are capable of maintaining our own". Some people might suppose that it would have a contrary tendency.

Soon after the arrival in India of Sir Charles Wood's reply, both despatches were published for general information. And in consequence of the entire approval by the Home authorities of the measures he had suggested, Lord Canning then circulated to the Princes and Chieftains of India, *sunnuds* or patents.—all or nearly all of them dated 11th March, 1862,—assuring those who were Hindoos, that "on failure of natural heirs, the British Government would permit and confirm any adoption of a successor," and those who were Mahomedans, that "the British Government would recognise and confirm any succession which may be legitimate according to Mahomedan law".

In the Adoption Despatch Lord Canning had proposed "that the assurance should be given to every *Chief who now governs his own territory, and who holds a position higher than that of a Jaghiredar*". And in every one of the circular *sunnuds* it was announced that "Her Majesty" was "desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chieftains *who now govern their own territories* should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their Houses should be continued." Lord Canning, however, did not rigidly confine the distribution of these patents within the prescribed limits; some inconsistencies and irregularities may be pointed out, while in certain instances there was a decided inapplicability in the stereotyped language of the *sunnud* to the political status of the recipient.

For example, *sunnuds* were sent to two Mahratta Princes,—the Rajah of Kolapore, who had not "governed his own territories" for sixteen years, and the Rajah of Sawunt Warree, who had not "governed his own territories" for twenty-four years.\* These two States were taken, just as Mysore had been taken in 1831, under

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864 (Longmans, London), vol. vi, pp. 90, 114, 118.

British management,—Sawunt Warree in 1838, Kolapore in 1846,—after a period of disorder and rebellion, which in the case of Kolapore assumed the proportions of a war against the British Government. Both of these Principalities had also, like Mysore, been marked down for annexation on the death of the reigning Princes; but being, unlike Mysore, very small and poor States, they were reprieved in 1860, when it began to be acknowledged, even at Calcutta, that the policy of annexation was for the most part a financial failure.

The Rajah of Sawunt Warree does not “*now* govern his own territories”. He receives at this day a fixed allowance from the revenues of the State, which is still retained under British management.

Again, *sunnuds* were issued to Sirdar Shumsher Sing Sindhanwalla and to Rajah Tej Sing, in which they were styled “Princes who now govern their own territories,” although, as admitted subsequently in the authorised Collection of Treaties, they were in fact, “ordinary jaghi-redars, having ordinary magisterial and revenue powers within their estates, but no powers of government”.†

A *sunnud* in the same terms was granted to the Rajah of Benares,† a personage of great dignity and influence, but actually no more than a Zemindar or land-holder, having no “State” under his rule, and no powers of government.

Lord Dalhousie had refused in 1854 to recognise the succession of Janojee Bhonsla, the grand-nephew and adopted heir of the last Rajah of Nagpore, and had annexed the State as a “lapse”. In consideration of the good conduct of the family during the rebellion of 1857, the title of Rajah and the ancient estates of the family were secured to Janojee Bhonsla and his heirs, with the right of adoption recognised, under a *sunnud* from Lord Canning.‡ It does not, however, appear that this was one of the circular *sunnuds* of the 11th of March, 1862.

Thus the circulation of the patents of 1862, restoring some of the rights of inheritance which a previous admini-

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, Calcutta, 1863 (Longmans, and Co., London), vol. ii, p. 375.

† *Ibid.*, p. 67.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 94.

stration had done so much to destroy, was not in practice confined by Lord Canning to those Princes who were then "governing their own territories". In going as far as he did, that upright and high-minded ruler went far beyond his immediate advisers and chief officials at Calcutta. And yet he was not so completely free from local influences as to relinquish any of the past encroachments, or even to abandon, by a clearly declared principle, all claim to similar "lapses" in the future. A few reservations were still made, *in petto*; and, with the avowed object of securing these reserved cases, the following plan was proposed in the Adoption Despatch.

"I recommend that in every case, Mahomedan or Hindoo, the assurance should be conveyed to each Chief individually, and not by a general notification addressed to all. This would be necessary, in order to avoid future claims from petty Jaghiredars or others, whom it is not intended to include in this measure."

Among those "*others*," whom it was "not intended to include in this measure," were two of the highest importance,—the Rajah of Mysore and the Nawab of Bengal, neither of whom "governed his own territories,"—the Rajah, however, being unquestionably the Sovereign of Mysore, although his executive powers were suspended; while the Nawab, as unquestionably, merely held in Bengal, under Treaties that deprived him of all administrative authority, the position of a mediatised Prince.

The Principality of Mysore, producing an annual revenue of more than a million sterling, was, with the exception of that of the Nizam of Hyderabad, the richest Native State in India. The Rajah's personal income was nearly £140,000 a year.

The Nawab of Bengal was the richest of all the mediatised Princes. His charge on the revenues of Bengal,—much reduced from its original amount by the recorded concessions, and subsequently by the helpless acquiescence of his predecessors,—stood then, as it stands at present, by the prescription of a century, and after five successions, at £160,000 per annum.

These two rich benefices had been duly registered by Lord Dalhousie for sequestration on the death of their

respective incumbents, but the lives did not happen to fall in during his tenure of office. Nothing could have saved either of them if a demise had occurred in the midst of that brilliant career,—brilliant, that is to say, as painted by the principal actor himself. Every piece of work that he produced was blindly accepted at the value he chose to put upon it. The actual cost at the time was much greater than his English admirers imagined. But the real cost of the annexations only came to light, the real price only began to be paid, after he had left India. It is very doubtful whether it has yet been paid up in full.

Although Lord Canning, enlightened by the phenomena of the mutinies and rebellion, manifested a large appreciation of what would be a sound Imperial policy in the Adoption Despatch and in some of his later dealings with Native States, he was not, as we have said, so fully emancipated from official orthodoxy as to reject the two rich legacies bequeathed by his predecessor. In secret Minutes recorded for his successor's edification, Lord Dalhousie had pointed out the Mysore Rajah's Principality and the Bengal Nawab's endowment as good things that were likely to fall in, and must not be allowed to slip through our fingers.\*

Lord Canning unquestionably so far consented to the views of his predecessor as not to send the new patent of succession to either the Rajah of Mysore or the Nawab of Bengal. Besides these negative indications of concurrence, two letters must be mentioned,—one addressed to the Rajah, the other intended for the Nawab's perusal,—despatched within two months of Lord Canning's departure from India, when he was enfeebled by the illness that was so soon to prove fatal. The letter for the Nawab's information was dated on the 14th of January, and that addressed to the Rajah of Mysore on the 11th of March, 1862, the very day before Lord Canning left Calcutta. He died in London on the 17th of June. These letters

\* The first Minute aimed against the permanence of the Nawab Nazim's dignity was written in November, 1853. The Minute marking down the State of Mysore is dated 16th January, 1856.

are notoriously not of his composition, nor of the tone and temper that he was wont to sanction, although he signed them at the last moment, glad, probably, amidst an accumulation of arrears, to dispose of two irritating and perplexing subjects that pressed for settlement, and which he felt ought not to be transferred to Lord Elgin, after long delay, in an undetermined state. Both of these letters are written in a peculiarly offensive style, that became well known in subsequent years through the productions of the Calcutta Foreign Office. A remarkable similarity in language and in argument characterises these two despatches. In both of them a perfectly novel position is taken up; the Nawab and the Rajah are plainly told, for the first time in their lives, that their dignities and possessions are not hereditary. The Secretary to the Government of India thus instructs the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal :—

“It should be clearly explained to His Highness, that the Governor-General in Council entirely rejects his claims so far as they are founded on the assertion of any Treaty-rights, or of any sovereign or hereditary titles, and that his recognised position in regard to the sum of sixteen lacs of Sicca rupees, now annually set apart for Nizamut purposes, and to the accumulations thereof, is as follows :—

“Since 1771, sixteen lacs of Rupees have been granted for Nizamut purposes. The continued payment of this sum is guaranteed by no Treaty, and it has hitherto been paid of the free grace and favour of the British Government. It may cease, or may be diminished, whenever the Government shall determine, but there is no intention of making any change in the present arrangement during the lifetime of the present Nawab.”

The Nawab of Bengal is charged in this despatch with having “set forth unfounded pretensions,” “erroneous statements and inferences”.

In the letter addressed to the Rajah of Mysore, his Highness is accused of putting forward “pretensions based upon erroneous assumptions,” and “assumptions without foundation,” and his actual position, as interpreted by the official writer, is expounded as follows :—

“Your Highness is now enjoying the personal provision which was secured to you in the event of that Government resuming

the administration of Mysore. This provision is a personal right, not a heritable one. It is not claimable as a right even by a natural-born heir, however liberally the Government might of its own grace be disposed to deal with a claim from such a quarter.

“Your title to that right is exactly the same as was your title to the authority which you forfeited through misrule; that is, it rests upon favour shown to your Highness by the British Government in its mode of dealing with other rights which it had acquired by conquest.”\*

Just as the Nawab of Bengal was informed that the Governor-General rejected his claims, “founded on the assertion of treaty-rights, or of sovereign or hereditary titles,” so the Rajah of Mysore was told that he was “very ill-advised” to call in question the treatment of his affairs, “upon the grounds of assumed ancestral and hereditary rights which have no existence,” and that “the rights of conquest and sovereignty” belonged to the British Government, which had “become Sovereign” over the people of Mysore.

But we know that Lord Canning’s policy in the Mysore case, as avowed in documents undoubtedly from his own pen, was based on grounds quite incompatible with the claim to territorial sovereignty in Mysore on the part of the British Government. Two years before this novel claim was advanced, Lord Canning had declared his belief that “by a little patience” the British Government would obtain “a bequest” of the Principality of Mysore “in free will” and “full sovereignty,” and “in a spirit of loyal attachment,” by its “venerable Sovereign,”—“more than sixty years of age, and of a family notoriously short-lived.”† In the despatch to the Secretary of State just quoted, Lord Canning repeatedly terms the Rajah the Sovereign of Mysore, and the people of that country “the subjects” of the Rajah, terms quite inconsistent with the alleged sovereignty of the British Government, to which Lord Canning set his signature one day before he left India. From the same despatch we learn that Lord Canning had been for a long time under the erroneous impression that

\* *Papers, Mysore* (No. 112), 1866, p. 6.

† Despatch to the Secretary of State (Sir Charles Wood), dated 30th March, 1860.

the Rajah did not wish to adopt an heir, and was desirous "that everything that he possessed should at his death pass into the hands" of the British Government, which will probably account for the adoption patent—forwarded, as we have seen, to several Princes who did not then "govern their own territories"—not having been sent to the Rajah of Mysore.

It is impossible to say what would have been the counsel of Lord Canning if he had known that the Maharajah of Mysore would long outlive the period officially allotted to him, and would in due course adopt a young kinsman to be heir to all his possessions, as he did on the 18th of June, 1865.

It is impossible to say how Lord Canning would have treated the Bengal Nawab's case, if he had been able to give it his personal attention, instead of being compelled by ill health and an excessive press of business to leave it for disposal by a Secretary. But it is quite incredible that he should have ever deliberately denied the Nawab's "*hereditary titles*" and "*treaty-rights*," as was done in the passage extracted above from the letter of the 14th of January, 1862.\* Such a denial would have been in flagrant contradiction to all the previous utterances and acts of his official intercourse with the Nawab, as an example of which a sentence may be quoted from the letter addressed to his Highness by Lord Canning,—in conformity with twenty precedents during the last century,—on arriving at Calcutta, to assume the office of Governor-General, and dated the 11th of March, 1856.

"Your Highness may be assured, the consideration, respect, and friendly interest in the prosperous administration of your affairs, and just regard to the *honours and dignities due to your hereditary rank* and the prescriptive privileges of your high station, *guaranteed by the stipulations of subsisting Treaties* and long established relations, observed and cherished by former Governors-General, will on the part also of this sincere friend, be fervently fostered and punctually fulfilled."

Mr. Edmonstone, also, Foreign Secretary under Lord Canning's Government, wrote a semi-official letter, dated

\* *Ante*, p. 9.

8th January, 1859, to Colonel Colin Mackenzie, who was then the Governor-General's Agent at the Nawab's Court, one passage in which is enough to prove how far Lord Canning's real opinions and feelings were from accordance with the acrimonious rejection of hereditary right contained in the letter of the 14th of January, 1862. The Agent had written to the Foreign Secretary, submitting a "Narrative of Nizamut affairs" for the consideration of Government, giving a general support to the Nawab's claims and complaints, and laying particular stress on the hereditary tenure of his Highness's dignity and revenue. Here is the extract from Mr. Edmonstone's reply :—

"The narrative is extremely useful, and should awaken the attention of Government to the position of the Nawab and the state of its relations with him. The whole subject has been more than once under the consideration of the Governor-General, and has also been discussed with me as often; but no final decision has been recorded, although I believe the Governor-General has made up his mind on the matter. I am not, of course, at liberty to inform you of the opinion the Governor-General appears to me to have formed, but I may say confidentially that it is not unfavourable. I wish you well in your endeavours to right His Highness, and have little doubt that you will succeed in some measure."

Of course it must be unequivocally acknowledged that no inferences or conjectures, however logical and reasonable, will suffice to disassociate Lord Canning personally from any proceeding of his Government, so far as to release him from formal responsibility. The only grounds, indeed, on which we can hope to strip the two disinheriting despatches of such moral support as they might derive from Lord Canning's deliberate approval, are those of the fatal illness which, during the last two months of his residence in India, must have materially diminished his capacity for work, never equal to that of his indefatigable predecessor.

For all practical purposes, however, it has become an immaterial question whether the technical irregularity of separating Lord Canning from some of the last acts of his administration can be tolerated or not, for any weight or authority that the two disinheriting despatches may ever

have possessed has already been broken down by one of them having been utterly rejected and set aside by the Imperial Government with the cognizance and sanction of Parliament. And when Lord Cranborne (now Marquis of Salisbury), on the 23rd of February, and his immediate successor, Sir Stafford Northcote, on the 24th of May, 1867, without the proposal of a division, almost without a word of doubt being heard, announced in the House of Commons their intention of reversing the decision of the Indian Government, repeatedly avowed, that Mysore must be annexed, and of maintaining that Principality by the recognition of the Maharajah's adopted heir, many Members, many Peers, and many persons of influence outside Parliament, may well have been deterred from upholding the threatened confiscation because they knew that the sentence passed on Mysore was not in fact Lord Canning's, but had been recorded in 1856, so that the authorities in 1867 really had to decide whether they would act as executors under a deferred process of Lord Dalhousie's reign of terror.

The same question has to be answered once more. It is an absolute certainty, not to be shaken by any plausible misrepresentation, that before the date of a certain Minute by Lord Dalhousie, afterwards embodied in a despatch to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, written in November 1853, no doubt as to the hereditary nature of the Bengal Nawab's dignity had ever been expressed or hinted at by any Governor-General or by the Home Government. No word of "grace or favour" was ever employed at any one of the five successions that have taken place since the Treaty of 1770. Neither the phrase nor the idea of "a personal Treaty," of binding force only during the life of the original contracting party, can be found in the transactions of any Governor-General, from Warren Hastings down to Lord Hardinge.

Our Ministers, our statesmen, Members of both Houses of Parliament, have to ask themselves whether they are willing by their silence, by their inaction, or by their votes, to assist in executing another confiscating clause in Lord Dalhousie's political testament.

The question of the Nawab of Bengal, as it stands at present, exactly resembles in another respect that of the Maharajah of Mysore. It is not so much an appeal against a blow, as a protest against a threat. There was this peculiarity in the Mysore case, that it offered the first opportunity that had ever been given to the British Parliament of pronouncing on an Indian annexation before it had been completed,—before, in fact, it was too late to remonstrate or interfere. Lord Dalhousie was able to carry out every one of his annexations without any awkward chance occurring of a discussion in the House of Commons. In two most important instances,—those of Jhansi and Nagpore,—he acted without any reference even to the Court of Directors, as if their concurrence were considered as a matter of certainty.\* But the Rajah of Mysore would not die in time; the recorded sentence against his heir became known and open to exception; and the Native State was reprieved.

The position of the Nawab of Bengal's protest at this moment is identical with that of the Maharajah of Mysore in 1867. Sentence of disinheritance has been recorded against the Nawab's family. The judge, however, who pronounced that sentence being the same whose condemnation of the Mysore State was quashed in 1867, the grounds alleged for the original sentence being the same as those alleged in the Mysore case, and the principles involved on both sides being equally applicable to both cases, the sentence may be reversed in the same way by the Great Council of the Empire. The only difference between the two cases is, that the Maharajah of Mysore was a territorial Sovereign, while the Nawab of Bengal is a mediatised Prince.

But Mr. Grant Duff, in the House of Commons, on the 4th of July, 1871, told us that the Nawab was not a Prince at all. The Under Secretary for India, who ought to know all about these things, delivered himself of these words:—"The Nawab Nazim of Bengal is no Prince; his father was no Prince; his grandfather was no Prince;

\* *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, page 37; *Jhansi Papers*, 1855, page 5.

none of his predecessors have been Indian Princes." And in another passage of the same speech the Nawab is called "the descendant of Meer Jaffier,—no Prince, but the officer of an officer of the King of Delhi."

If we supposed Mr. Grant Duff to be a firm believer in divine right, we could well understand such a sweeping depreciation, just as we can understand an ultra-legitimist denying the Princely rank of the Emperor Napoleon I, declaring him to be merely General Bonaparte, son of a Corsican attorney, and an officer of the King of France. We can understand the legitimist and Austrian partisan of the last century, who would refuse any higher dignity to the King of Prussia than that of Margrave of Brandenburg, the faithless and contumacious vassal of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine. These notions are still extant, it is said, in some very exalted circles. Certainly there may now be found in Germany both Royalists and Republicans who impugn the Imperial titles and attributes assumed by William of Hohenzollern.

We cannot, however, judging from his political dissertations, suppose Mr. Grant Duff to be either a Republican or a Legitimist, or to be ignorant of modern history and the axioms of political science. Yet he says that Meer Jaffier, the first Nawab of the present line, was "no Prince, but the officer of an officer of the King of Delhi." We must conclude, therefore, that if another revolution in the Danubian Principalities—the Lower Bengal of Europe—were to send Prince Charles back to Berlin; and the first ruler of united Roumania, Colonel Couza—whose military rank was conferred by some Hospodar of Moldavia—were to be restored, Mr. Grant Duff would not recognise his Princely dignity,—would cry him down as "no Prince, but the officer of an officer" of the Sultan of Turkey.

As Mr. Grant Duff would certainly be guilty of no such absurdity, as he is neither a Republican, a Legitimist, nor an ignoramus, we must in charity suppose him to have been speaking in the Nawab of Bengal's case from his instructions, and to have been misled by some experienced gentleman at the India office who undertook to coach him for the debate.

“The Nawab Nazim of Bengal,” says Mr. Grant Duff, “is no Prince; his father was no Prince; his grandfather was no Prince; none of his predecessors have been Indian Princes.”

To begin with the present Nawab Nazim,—leaving his father, grandfather and their predecessors for later consideration,—if he is “no Prince,” Mr. Grant Duff, or the office which he represents in the House of Commons, must possess a deposing or degrading power, and must have exercised it against his Highness about the 4th of July, 1871, for most assuredly the Nawab was fully recognised as a Prince by the Government of Great Britain and Ireland up to a very short time before the debate of that day.

If no decree of degradation has issued, and if Mr. Grant Duff did, nevertheless, on that occasion accurately expound the views of his superior, the Duke of Argyll, a singular conflict exists between two great Departments of State. The principal Secretary of State for India pronounces the Nawab of Bengal to be “no Prince”; the Lord Great Chamberlain pronounces that the Nawab of Bengal is a Prince, receives him as a Prince, and repeatedly introduces him with the forms reserved only for Royal personages into the very presence of Her Majesty. If any foreign nobleman, enjoying the title of Prince but not endowed with Royal honours, were to claim the right of being privately introduced, “with his suite,” at Her Majesty’s Court, and of being on all occasions of his presence there “attended” by a military officer, his claim would certainly be rejected. Yet this is the style in which, by the authority of the Lord Chamberlain, the visits of the Nawab of Bengal to Her Majesty’s levees and drawing-rooms were officially announced last year.

“His Highness the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, with his sons, Prince Ali Kudr-Hassan-Ali-Bahadoor, and Prince Suleiman-Kudr-Wahid-Ali-Bahadoor, was also present at the Court, attended by Colonel Frederic Layard.”

And the Nawab’s first introduction to the Queen is thus recorded in the official Court Circular.

“OSBORNE, *April 28th, 1869.*

“The Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India, arrived at Osborne to day, and had an audience of the Queen.

“His Highness the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, and his eldest and seventh sons, Prince Ali-Kudr-Hassan-Ali-Bahadoor and Prince Soliman-Kudr-Wahid-Ali-Bahadoor, arrived, and were presented to Her Majesty by the Duke of Argyll.

“The suite of the Nawab were presented to Her Majesty by the Duke of Argyll, and also Colonel Frederic Layard, of the Bengal Staff Corps, who is specially appointed to attend upon his Highness.”

Here the title of Prince, refused by the Under-Secretary to the Nawab, his father, his grandfather and his predecessors, is accorded by the Secretary of State for India even to the Nawab's sons.

Having seen that the present Nawab of Bengal was received, addressed and treated as a Prince in the year 1871 by the proper authorities, during his residence in London, let us now go back to the year 1838, and see how the same personage, whom Mr. Grant Duff declares to be “no Prince,” was received, addressed and treated by the proper authorities at Calcutta, when he first attained to what Mr. Grant Duff is pleased to call “the shadowy honours of the Nizamut”. On the death of his Highness's father, the Nawab Hoomayoon Jah, the following notifications appeared in the Government Gazette at the capital of the British Empire in India.

“POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, *19th December, 1838.*

“PROCLAMATION.

“By order of the Governor-General of India, the Deputy-Governor of Bengal notifies to the Public and to the Allies of the British Government, and to all friendly Powers, that the Nawab Shoojah-ool-Moolk, Ihtishamood-Dowlah, Humayoon Jah, Syud Mobaruck Ullee Khan Bahadoor, Feeroz Jung, having departed this life at Moorshedabad, on the 3rd October, 1838, his son the Nawab Syud Munsoor Ullee Khan, *has succeeded to the hereditary honours and dignities of the Nizamut and Soobahdarry of Bengal, Behar and Orissa*, and His Highness is hereby declared, under the authority of the Government of India, to be the Nazim and Soobahdar of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and to have assumed and to exercise the authority, dignities, and privileges thereof, under the style and title of Moontizum-ool-Moolk, Mohsen-ood-

Dowlah, Fareedoon Jah, Syud Munsoor Ullee Khan Bahadoor, Nusrut Jung.

Published and proclaimed by His Honour the Deputy-Governor of Bengal.

H. T. PRINSEP,

*Secretary to the Government of Bengal.*

*General Order by the Honourable the Deputy-Governor of Bengal, under date the 19th December, 1838.*

The Honourable the Deputy-Governor of Bengal has been pleased to direct, that a salute of nineteen guns be fired from the ramparts of Fort William at 12 o'clock this day, *in honour of the accession of his Highness Syud Munsoor Ullee Khan to the Musnud of the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa*, and that the above Proclamation be read at the head of all the troops in garrison at sunset this evening, under a salute of three volleys of musketry.

H. T. PRINSEP,

*Secretary to the Government of Bengal.*\*\*

The language and tenor of these official acts would not suggest to most of us that the person they refer to was "no Prince". On the contrary, the order for a salute of cannon, and the assembly of all the troops in garrison, to fire a *feu de joie* "in honour of the accession of his Highness Syud Munsoor Ullee Khan to the Musnud of the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa," sounds very much like the recognition of Royal dignities. A similar ceremonial is not usually observed, in any known part of the world, when a mere nobleman succeeds to his ancestral estates, or to a charge on the public revenue. Although the full heraldic style of an English Duke is that of "high, mighty and puissant Prince," his "accession" is not publicly announced "to the Allies of the British Government and to all friendly Powers," nor are the troops called out to hear a Proclamation read, and to celebrate the event with military honours.

And before quitting this Proclamation, attention must be called to the fact that "the honours and dignities of the Nizamut," to which the present Nawab is said to have "succeeded," are therein also expressly declared to be "hereditary".

Mr. Grant Duff says, also, that the Nawab's father was

\* Extract from page 925 of the *Calcutta Gazette* of Wednesday, 19th December, 1838, No. 101. *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), pp. 34, 35.

“no Prince”. We might adduce the Proclamation on his accession, which is almost identical with that just quoted.

But from among many official documents publicly recorded we will only cite one as evidence against this clause in the Under Secretary's edict. In 1834, when the present Nawab's father, Meer Humayoon Jah, occupied the Musnud, an effort was made in the course of some legal proceedings to bring his Highness within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Calcutta. This was resisted, on behalf of the Nawab, by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck.

In a letter of instructions in this matter, addressed by his order to the Advocate General, and signed by “the Deputy Secretary to the Government, C. E. Trevelyan,” the following passages occur.

“It will be observed from the Treaty of 1770, of which a copy is annexed, that His Highness the Nawab has been recognised by the British Government as an independent Prince, and that the national faith is pledged for nothing being proposed or carried into execution derogating from his honor.”

“As the Government has no power to regulate the proceedings of the Court towards persons acknowledged to come within its jurisdiction, if the liability of the Nazim were to be admitted, there is no degree of indignity which might not be inflicted upon him by its ordinary processes, in contravention of the pledged national faith, and of the respect which is obviously due to the representative of our oldest Ally on this side of India.”

“The case of Raja Hurreenauth Rae, referred to by the Advocate-General, does not appear to His Honor in Council to bear any analogy to the present. Raja Hurreenauth Rae was a subject of this Government, from whose gift he derived his title, while the Nawab Nazim is a Prince, whose independence has been recognised by a Treaty with one of his Predecessors.”\*

This, be it once more observed, was written in 1834 of the present Nawab's father, declared in 1871, by Mr. Grant Duff, to have been “no Prince”.

We may, perhaps, leave the grandfather and predecessors alone for the present, for by this time even Mr. Grant Duff himself might admit that he was wrong in denying that the Nawabs were Princes. It may be urged that, after all, this was merely a verbal error, and that what Mr. Grant Duff meant was that neither the Nawab,

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 34.

his father, nor any one of his predecessors was a Sovereign. Be it so,—we may inquire into that by and by. But surely it would not have been beyond the resources of the Under Secretary's eloquence to have stated that proposition in more accurate and measured language.

Assuming that the intention of the Under Secretary was only to impugn the Sovereignty of the Nawab, it is impossible to acquit him, or the permanent officials at the India Office on whom he incautiously relied for information, of a serious deviation from the calm and dignified course becoming those who profess to speak with authority the mind of the Imperial Government. The Nawab's case must gain in strength if it becomes manifest that the stronger party cannot, without abandoning common candour and ordinary courtesy, make even a plausible answer to it.

Mr. Grant Duff's assertions, therefore, as charitably amended, will now stand thus:—The Nawab is no Sovereign; his father was no Sovereign; his grandfather was no Sovereign; none of his predecessors have been Indian Sovereigns. His ancestor, Meer Jaffier, was no Sovereign, but the officer of an officer of the King of Delhi.

Let us begin at the beginning. Before the battle of Plassey on the 23rd of June, 1757, Meer Jaffier, the first Nawab of the existing line, was undoubtedly neither Prince nor Sovereign. He was uncle by marriage of the reigning Nawab, Suraj-ood-Dowlah, and Commander-in-Chief of his army. As such he may be said—if a disparaging designation be wanted,—to have been “an officer of an officer of the King of Delhi”. The Nawab Nazim of Bengal was—formally and ceremonially at least—an officer of the Great Mogul.

But the status of Meer Jaffier before the battle of Plassey, is a matter of merely historical or biographical interest. We want to know what Meer Jaffier became after the complete success of his confederacy with the English East India Company, and after the execution of the Treaty of 1757. For all purposes of political science or international law, it matters no more what Meer Jaffier was before his installation, than what Napoleon Bonaparte was before he became Emperor of the French.

Foreign nations recognised Napoleon as the Sovereign of France. The English, the Dutch and the French recognised Meer Jaffier as the Sovereign of Bengal.

Formally and ceremonially the Nawab of Bengal was an officer and a vassal of the Mogul Emperor, just as Mehemet Ali, during the height of his rebellious career, was the humble servant of the Sultan, just as his descendant, the Khedive of Egypt, is to this day. The rulers of Bengal in the eighteenth century, like the rulers of Egypt since 1840, paid tribute to their Suzerain, assumed no higher titles than were conferred by the fountain of honour, and petitioned for confirmation and investiture at each succession. But like the rulers of Egypt they maintained all the substance of administrative independence.

In writing history, and in discussing political events, we must accept the condition and powers of States and Princes as we find them when each transaction takes place. We must neither anticipate nor retrograde. We must not revive dogmatically bygone prerogatives, destroyed amidst the revolutionary changes which opened the road for our interference, for the purpose of depreciating at this late hour the local authorities whose co-operation was in former days indispensable for our safety and success.

To speak of the Nazim of Hyderabad or the Nawab Vizier of Oude as refractory Deputies or Lord Lieutenants, —to talk of the Nawab of Bengal as merely an officer of the King of Delhi,—is as absurd as it would be to speak of the King of Prussia in the eighteenth century as merely the Margrave of Brandenburg and Arch-Chamberlain of the German Emperor.

It is true that some of the Indian Princes, with whom our adventurous countrymen first came in contact, or those Princes' ancestors, had been tributaries, feudatories, or provincial Governors under the Great Mogul; some of them had no better original title than that of a rebellious vassal or contumacious Lieutenant; but then the East India Company entered upon the field of negotiation with no more secure footing, with no higher pretensions.

The English Authorities avowed themselves to be vas-

sals of the King of Delhi, tenants and tributaries of the Nizam of the Deccan and the Nawab of Bengal, and entered into various complicated relations with them of joint management, partnership and assignment. At successive political conjunctures these embarrassing engagements were, for the most part, shaken off or commuted; the ambiguous tenures were simplified or converted into cessions; but whatever new rights of sovereignty and independence may have been gained by the East India Company, must have been equally conceded to those successful confederates and to those defeated adversaries with whom they treated.

The British Government, having by various public acts recognised Meer Jaffier, the ancestor of the present Nawab of Bengal, as a Sovereign, having made Treaties with him and with several of his descendants, cannot now, with any truth, justice or decency, deny retrospectively the sovereignty of the other contracting parties.

Nor can the British Government,—with any truth, justice or decency,—having regularly at each succession to the Nizamut, and repeatedly on other occasions, acknowledged the continuous existence and binding force of those Treaties, suddenly declare that it will be no longer bound by them, and that upon its will and pleasure alone henceforth must depend the rank and revenue of the other contracting parties.

The English East India Company recognised the Nawab Meer Jaffier as a Sovereign, when they concluded with him the Treaty of 1757, in the 2nd Article of which he declared that “the enemies of the English should be his enemies”; in the 3rd Article of which he promised that “all the effects and factories belonging to the French” should “remain in the possession of the English,”—nor would he “ever allow the French any more to settle in the three Provinces” of Bengal, Behar and Orissa; and by the 8th and 9th Articles of which, he granted to the East India Company the “tracts of land, belonging to several Zemindars,” “within the ditch which surrounds the borders of Calcutta,” and “all the land lying to the South of Cal-

cutta, as far as Culpee.”\* Who but a Sovereign could enter into such engagements as these?

The Nawab Meer Jaffier was recognised as a Sovereign when the East India Company accepted at his hands a General *Sunnud*, or circular order to all officers of “the Government in the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa,” granting the Company exemption from “all duties” on their goods, by “land or by water.”†

The East India Company recognised the Nawab Meer Jaffier as a Sovereign when they received from him a *Sunnud* by which “the office of the Zemindarry of the Twenty Four Pergunnahs” was conferred “upon the Noblest of Merchants, the English Company, to the end that they attend to the rites and customs thereof, as is fitting, nor in the least circumstance neglect or withhold the vigilance and care due thereto,” “that they deliver into the treasury, at proper times, the due rents of the Circar,” render annual accounts, and maintain peace and good order “within the limits of their Zemindarry.”‡

The Nawab Meer Jaffier was recognised as the Sovereign of Bengal in the Treaty of 1763, by Article II of which he did “grant and confirm to the Company, for defraying the expenses of their troops, the Chucklas” (districts) “of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong”; by Article XI of which he did “confirm and renew the Treaty formerly made with the Dutch”; and by Article 12 of which he undertook, “if the French come into the country,” “not to allow them to erect any fortifications, maintain forces, hold lands or Zemindaries”.§

Who but the Sovereign of the country could make territorial grants to the English, or enforce restrictions against the Dutch and French?

It is true that in some of the *Sunnuds* issued by the Nawab, granting lands, privileges and exemptions to the East India Company, the old forms of deference to “the

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, Calcutta, 1862 (Longmans, London), vol. i, p. 11, 12; *Parliamentary Papers, Nawab Nazim of Bengal*, No. 371 of 1870, p. 8.

† *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, p. 13.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 51, 53; *Parliamentary Papers, Nawab Nazim of Bengal*, No. 371 of 1870, p. 9.

Imperial Court, the Asylum of the World," are kept up, but no such allusions appear in either of the Treaties with Meer Jaffier, and no overture was made to the reigning King during the progress or on the completion of these weighty transactions.

In 1758, in 1761, and again in 1764, the combined forces of the Nawab and the Company successfully resisted the so-called Imperial armies which invaded Bengal, and endeavoured to dispossess our serviceable Ally. It was not until August 1765, six months after the installation of Meer Jaffier's son and successor, Nudjum-ood-Dowlah, and the conclusion of a Treaty with him, that the English obtained from the Emperor Shah Alum a confirmation of their arrangements with the Nawab of Bengal, and their own appointment to the Dewannee, or revenue administration. In the words of the historian, Captain Grant Duff,—“The English, at the period of Meer Jaffier's death, had Bengal at their disposal, and the Emperor's person in their power. The youngest son of Meer Jaffier was made Nawab of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa in February 1765, and the East India Company, previously charged with the military protection of this territory, were appointed his Dewan in the August following.”\*

The sovereignty of the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah was fully recognised in the Treaty of 1765, in the Preamble of which the East India Company undertook to secure him “the Soubahdarry of the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; and to support him therein against all his enemies”.

“And,” it continues, “as our troops will be more to be depended on than any the Nabob can have, and less expensive to him, he need, therefore, entertain none but such as are requisite for the support of the Civil Officers of his Government, and the business of his collections through the different districts”.†

The sovereignty of the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah is also fully recognised in a Treaty concluded at Allahabad,

\* Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. ii, p. 221.

† *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, p. 56; *Parliamentary Papers, Nawab Nazim of Bengal*, 371 of 1870, p. 11.

on the 16th of August, 1765, by Lord Clive and General Carnac, "invested with full and ample powers on the behalf of his Excellency the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah, Soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa," and likewise on behalf of the English East India Company, "to settle a firm and lasting peace with his Highness the Nawab" of Oude, "Shujah-ood-Dowlah, Vizier of the Empire".

In Article I of this Treaty "a perpetual and universal peace, sincere friendship and firm union" is "established between his Highness Shujah-ood-Dowlah," the Nawab Vizier of Oude, "on the one part, and his Excellency Nudjum-ood-Dowlah and the English East India Company on the other; so that the said contracting powers shall give the greatest attention to maintain between themselves, their dominions and their subjects this reciprocal friendship."

It is provided by Article II of the same Treaty that if "the dominions" of the Nawab of Oude shall "hereafter be attacked," the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah and the English Company shall assist him, "and if the dominions of his Excellency Nudjum-ood-Dowlah or the English Company shall be attacked, his Highness shall, in like manner, assist them with a part or the whole of his forces."

In Article XI of the same Treaty, "His Highness Shujah-ood-Dowlah," the Nawab of Oude, "his Excellency the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah, and the English Company, promise to observe sincerely and strictly all the Articles contained and settled in the present Treaty; and they will not suffer the same to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their respective subjects; and the said contracting powers, generally and reciprocally, guarantee to each other all the stipulations of the present Treaty."\*

It is difficult to believe that Mr. Grant Duff, Under-Secretary of State for India, would now venture to say, on mature consideration, that this Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah, Soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, one of "the contracting powers" to this Treaty of "perpetual peace," and who is therein said to have "dominions" and "subjects," was neither a Prince nor a Sovereign.

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. ii, p. 76, 79.

Even in the Royal *firman*s of 1765, granting the English Company the Dewannee of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and the "conditional jaghire" of the Province of Bengal, although the customary style of Imperial Suzerainty is kept up, the territorial dominion and administrative independence of the Nawab are effectually acknowledged; and the Company, although invested with functions of great power and influence as Dewan or Financial Minister, and as security for the Royal revenue or tribute of Bengal, is yet formally recognised as possessing merely an official authority subordinate and inferior to that of the Nawab. In the accurate language of the Indian diplomatist and historian whom we have just quoted:—"The youngest son of Meer Jaffier was Nawab of Bengal, Behar and Orissa,"—"the East India Company, previously charged with the military protection of this territory, were appointed his Dewan."\*

Thus the sum of twenty-six lakhs of rupees (£260,000) "appointed" for the Royal revenue, is due from "the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah,"—the Company is only to be "security" for its punctual payment.†

Again, in the "Articles of Agreement," "the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah agrees to pay his Majesty out of the revenues of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, the sum of twenty-six lakhs of rupees a year;" and "the English Company do engage themselves to be security for the regular payment." "But," it is further provided, "in case *the territories of the aforesaid Nawab* should be invaded by any foreign enemy, a deduction is then to be made out of the stipulated revenues.‡ Thus even after the grant of the Dewannee to the Company, the Nawab still remains Lord of the territories and master of the revenues, which the Company administer for him, as "his Dewan."

The financial stipulations of the Treaty of 1765 could, however, no longer be carried out as therein provided, the Company, and not the Nawab, having now the collection and management of the revenue. The following new

\* *Ante*, p. 24.

† Firmān from the King Shah Alum, *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, pp. 60, 61.

‡ *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, pp. 64, 65.

“Agreement” was therefore made, in which the Company appears for the first time as the disbursing authority. It is dated on the 30th of September, 1765, just six weeks after the Treaty of Peace with Oude.

“The King having been graciously pleased to grant to the English Company the Dewanny of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, with the revenues thereof, as a free gift for ever, on certain conditions, whereof one is that there shall be a sufficient allowance out of the said revenues for supporting the expenses of the Nizamut, be it known to all whom it may concern, that I do agree to accept of the annual sum of Sicca Rupees 53,86,131, as an adequate allowance for the support of the Nizamut, which is to be regularly paid, as follows, viz., the sum of Rupees 17,78,854 for all my household expenses, servants, etc., and the remaining sum of Rupees 36,07,277 for the maintenance of such horses, sepoy, peons, burkundauzes, etc., as may be thought necessary for my *suwarry*” (retinue) “and the support of my dignity only, should such an expense hereafter be found necessary to be kept up, but on no account ever to exceed that amount, and having a perfect reliance on Maeen-ood-Dowla, I desire he may have the disbursing of the above sum of Rupees 36,07,277, for the purpose above mentioned. This Agreement (by the blessing of God) I hope will be inviolably observed, as long as the English Company’s factories continue in Bengal.”\*

This document marks a most critical period in the relations between the British Government and the Nawab Nazim. It is the contemporary record by both contracting parties of the political changes produced when the East India Company was invested with the Dewannee of Bengal. The most important condition in the grant of the Dewannee to the East India Company—the conditional nature of which is set forth plainly enough in all the Royal *firman*s,—is herein specifically settled. The Company, as Dewan or Financial Administrator, having been required to provide for the expenses of the Nizamut, the Nawab Nazim and the Dewan settle between them what will be “a sufficient allowance” for that purpose. This being such an important document, it is very remarkable that its existence, or at least its purport, seems to have been entirely overlooked or misunderstood by those within whose sphere of power and duty it has re-

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, p. 65.

cently fallen to interpret and declare the rights of the Nawab Nazim of Bengal.

For example, Sir Charles Wood (now Lord Halifax), as Secretary of State for India, in the despatch of the 17th of June, 1864, to which we have already referred as the main cause of the pending appeal, very correctly describes the present Nawab as "a descendant of Meer Jaffier Ali," but very incorrectly proceeds thus—"who when the East India Company were first invested with the Dewannee of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, was at the head of the Nizamut of those Provinces,"\*—the fact being that the East India Company was not invested with the Dewannee until seven months after Meer Jaffier's death, and eight years after their treaty with him. During Meer Jaffier's life the office of Dewan was actually in the Nawab's own gift, for whatever may be said of Imperial prerogative, the Mogul Emperor was during the whole of that period either utterly powerless or at war with the Nawab and the Company.

Sir Charles Wood antedates by eight years the Company's investiture with the Dewannee, and totally forgets that the Company was only in a position to ask and obtain that appointment, in consequence of the Treaty and of eight years' alliance with the Nawab Nazim.

Let us see how the acquisition of the Dewannee was viewed by the contemporary English authorities at Calcutta and in London. The Governor and Council of Bengal, in a despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 30th of September, 1765, after alleging "the perpetual struggles for superiority between the Nawabs and your agents, together with the recent proofs of notorious and avowed corruption," as the grounds of their successful efforts "to obtain the Dewanny of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa for the Company," proceed as follows:—

"By establishing the power of the Great Mogul, we have likewise established his rights; and His Majesty, from principles of gratitude, equity and policy, has thought proper to bestow this important employment on the Company, the nature of which is, the collecting all the revenues, and, after defraying the expenses of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the

\* *Parliamentary Papers, Nawab Nazim*, No. 371 of 1870, p. 3.

Nizamut, to remit the remainder to Delhi, or wherever the King shall reside or direct.”\*

They explain that in order to fulfil “certain stipulations and agreements expressed in the *Sunnud*,” they “have settled with the Nawab, with his own free will and consent, that the sum of 53 lacs” (£530,000) “shall be annually paid to him for the support of his dignity, and all contingent expenses, exclusive of the charge of maintaining an army, which is to be defrayed out of the revenues ceded to the Company by this Royal grant of the Dewanny.”

“By this acquisition of the Dewanny,” they continue, “your possessions and influence are rendered permanent and secure, since no future Nawab will have either power or riches sufficient to attempt your overthrow by means either of force or corruption.”

In the concluding paragraph of the letter they say :—

“The experience of years has convinced us that a division of power is impossible without generating discontent, and hazarding the whole. All must belong either to the Company or to the Nabob, and we leave you to judge which alternative is the most desirable and the most expedient in the present circumstances of affairs. As to ourselves, we know of no system we could adopt that could less affect the Nabob’s dignity, and at the same time secure the Company against the fatal effects of future revolutions, than this of the Dewanny.”†

Here it is plain enough that the English officials at Calcutta, however determined to free themselves from the “division of power,” laid no claim to territorial dominion, and knew very well that they could not carry on the administration of Bengal without the moral support and politico-legal standing in the country conferred upon them by their maintenance of the Nawab’s dignity.

The Court of Directors, in their reply, dated the 17th of May, 1766, complain of the rapacity and corruption of their servants, who have been “grasping the greatest share of that part of the Nawab’s revenues which was not allowed to the Company,” and who, “whilst the Company was sinking under the burden of the war, were

\* *Parliamentary Papers, Dewanny of Bengal* (371, ii, of 1870), p. 1.

† *Papers, Dewanny of Bengal* (371, ii, of 1870), pp. 1, 2.

enriching themselves from those very funds that ought to have supported the war," and who have managed to make the Company's largest *jaghire*, the district of Burdwan, simply a source of illicit gain for themselves. They are doubtful of the advantage of enlarging their direct possessions, and object to undertaking the entire administration.

"We observe the account you give of the office and power of the King's Dewan in former times, was the collecting of all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the Nizamut, to remit the remainder to Delhi. This description of it is not the office we wish to execute; the experience we have already had in the province of Burdwan convinces us how unfit an Englishman is to conduct the collection of the revenues, and follow the subtle Native through all his arts to conceal the real value of his country, to perplex and to elude the payments. We therefore entirely approve of your preserving the ancient form of Government in the upholding the dignity of the Soubah"—the Nawab.

They desire that the public service of Bengal shall continue to be carried on by the Nawab's officers under the supervision of "the Resident at the Durbar," and "the control of the Governor and Select Committee, the ordinary bounds of which control should extend to nothing beyond the superintending the collection of the revenues and the receiving the money from the Nabob's treasury to that of the Dewanny or the Company."

"This we conceive to be the whole office of the Dewanny. The administration of justice, the appointments to offices, zemindaries, in short, whatever comes under the denomination of civil administration, we understand is to remain in the hands of the Nabob or his ministers."\*

Nudjum-ood-Dowlah having in the Preamble, already cited,† of the Treaty of 1765, entrusted the military protection of his territories to the East India Company, his English allies might, after the grant of the Dewannee, and his acceptance of a fixed annual sum for his "household expenses" and the support of his "dignity only," have easily seized upon almost the whole machinery of

\* *Parliamentary Papers, Dewanny of Bengal*, 371; ii, of 1870, pp. 2, 3.

† *Ante*, p. 27.

civil government, if they had then considered it prudent and practicable to work it for themselves. But they did not so consider it. A species of double government was instituted; the Company's officials exercised a strict supervision over the receipts and disbursements, but the Government was carried on in the Nawab's name, the whole administrative and executive power being concentrated in the hands of his chief Minister, Mahomed Reza Khan, with the title of Naib Nazim, or Deputy,—the same person who is mentioned under that name in Article II of the Treaty of 1765, and as the Nabob Minah-ood-Dowla in the Treaties of 1766 and 1770.\*

Nudjum-ood-Dowlah died on the 8th of May, 1766, one year and a quarter after his accession; and was succeeded by his brother, Syef-ood-Dowlah, aged only sixteen. The Governor and Council of Calcutta, feeling their position much strengthened by their complete success against the Nawab Vizier of Oude, and the Treaty of Peace concluded in the previous year, took immediate advantage of their recently augmented power, and of the new Nawab's youth, inexperience and relative weakness, to reduce very considerably the sum allotted for the Nizamut. In a fresh Treaty dated the 19th of May, 1766, the Governor and Council engaged "to secure to the Nabob Syef-ood-Dowla, the Soubahdarry of the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and to support him therein with the Company's forces against all his enemies." The Nawab also for his part agreed to ratify and confirm "the Treaty which my father formerly concluded with the Company upon his first accession to the Nizamut, engaging to regard the honour and reputation of the Company and of the Governor and Council as his own, and that entered into with my brother, Nabob Nazim-ul-Dowla."

The 2nd Article of this Treaty must be given at full length.

"The King has been graciously pleased to grant unto the English East India Company the Dewannyship of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, as a free gift for ever; and I, having an entire confidence

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim of Bengal* (371 of 1870), pp. 12, 14, 16; *Aitchison's Treaties*, Calcutta, 1862, vol. i, pp. 57, 67, 69.

in them, and in their servants settled in this country, that nothing whatever be proposed or carried into execution by them, derogating from my honour, dignity, interest, and the good of my country, do therefore, for the better conducting the affairs of the Soubahdarry, and promoting my honour and interest, and that of the Company, in the best manner, agree that the protecting the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and the force sufficient for that purpose, be entirely left to their discretion and good management, in consideration of their paying the King Shah Aalum, by monthly payments, as by treaty agreed on, the sum of *Rs.* 2,16,666. 10. 9.; and to me, Syef-ul-Dowla, the annual stipend of *Rs.* 41,86,131. 9., viz., the sum of *Rs.* 17,78,854. 1., for my house, servants, and other expenses indispensably necessary; and the remaining sum of *Rs.* 24,07,277. 8. for the support of such sepoys, peons, and bercundaazes as may be thought proper for my suwarry only; but, on no account, ever to exceed the amount.”\*

These are not exactly the terms that would be employed in an agreement between the lawful possessors and rulers of Bengal and a mere political pensioner, neither a Prince nor a Sovereign. The mutual relations of the parties are recognised as being the same as during the life of Nudjum-ood-Dowlah, but the annual sum allotted for the support of the Nawab’s dignity is diminished from £530,000 to £418,000.

The Court of Directors, in a despatch dated the 16th of March, 1768, noticing the succession of the Nawab Syef-ood-Dowlah, desire that the Governor and Council will “tender our compliments of condolence to the present Nabob, Syef-ood-Dowlah, and our congratulations on his accession and on his confirmation by the King, with assurance of our approbation of the Treaty entered into with him, and of our inviolable attachment to him and his family.” They express some dissatisfaction at their servants at Calcutta not having given a more detailed account of the facts relative to Nudjum-ood-Dowlah’s demise and the succession of his brother, and they add,

“All the forms of proclamation, and the acknowledgment of his successor should also be recorded as examples to future times, the observance of such forms being very essential to the stability of Government.

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim of Bengal* (371 of 1870), p. 14.

“As the reduction of the stipend to the Nabob arises from striking off the pay of an unnecessary number of his sepoy, and does not affect the allowance for support of his dignity in the Government, we approve what you have done in it, but we direct you never to reduce the stipend lower, being extremely desirous that he should have sufficient to support his public character, and appear respectable to his subjects and to foreigners.”\*

The support of the Nawab's dignity in the eyes of “*his subjects*” being considered “essential to the stability of Government,” it is evident that he was then upheld as the reigning Sovereign of Bengal, and was no more looked upon seriously as an officer of the Mogul Empire than the German Electoral Princes of the same period, notwithstanding their Household offices of Chamberlain, Cup-bearer and so forth, were looked upon seriously as officers of the Holy Roman Empire. No doubt the Nawab and the East India Company too—as we can see by their proceedings,—were very well satisfied to obtain confirmation by Royal grants of their possessions and immunities, because no one could foresee the effects of “future revolutions,”† and because such documents were good against all third parties, whether Dutch, French, or Mahrattas; but the Nawabs of Bengal had been virtually independent of Delhi for many years before our Treaty with Meer Jaffier, and after that Treaty we had, in concert with them, resisted in arms every effort of Imperial interference.

The tribute of Bengal, for which the Company, as Dewan, had undertaken to be security, was only paid to the Mogul Emperor for four or five years. The pitiable condition of the Mogul Court, after the invasion of India by Ahmed Shah Abdallee in 1757, is a matter of history. Although the whole of the continent still nominally owned the sway of the House of Timour, the Emperor could depend on a precarious revenue or tribute from only a very few Provinces, and was, for the most part, during several years a fugitive from his capital of Delhi, alternately occupied by the Affghans and the Mahrattas. From 1770 to 1803, he was virtually a state prisoner.

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 17.

† *Ante*, p. 29.

The Treaty of 1765, between the Nawab of Oude, on the one part, and the Nawab Nudjum-ood-Dowlah and the English Company,\* on the other part, was renewed and confirmed by a Treaty concluded at Benares on the 29th of November, 1768, between the Nawab Shujah-ood-Dowlah of Oude, the East India Company and “the Nawab Syef-ood-Dowla, Soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa”.†

There was no intention as yet, either in Calcutta or London, of getting rid of the double government of Bengal, although all real power in the three Provinces was now firmly held by the Governor and Council. On the eve of his final departure from India in 1767, Lord Clive thus expressed his views in a letter of instructions to the Select Committee :—

“The first point in politics which I offer to your consideration is the form of Government. We are sensible that since the acquisition of the Dewannee, the power formerly belonging to the Soubah” (Nawab) “of these Provinces is totally, in fact, vested in the East India Company. Nothing remains to him but the name and shadow of authority. This name, however, this shadow, it is indispensably necessary we should seem to venerate. Under the sanction of a Soubah, every encroachment that may be attempted by foreign Powers can effectually be crushed without any apparent interposition of our own authority, and all real grievances complained of by them can, through the same channel, be examined into and redressed. Be it therefore always remembered that there is a Soubah; and that though the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial jurisdictions must still rest in the Chiefs of the country, acting under him and this Presidency in conjunction.”

However clear it may now seem to us that this was an impracticable and inconsistent policy, it was by no means so clear in those days, and consequently the conversion of the Nawab Nazim into a mediatised Prince,—imminent ever since the grant of the Dewannee,—was not consummated during the reign of the Nawab Syef-ood-Dowlah.

In March 1770 Syef-ood-Dowlah died. The Governor and Council thus announced the installation of his brother Mobaruk-ood-Dowla, in a despatch to the Court of Directors, dated the 18th of March, 1770 :

\* *Ante*, pp. 24, 25.

† *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. ii, p. 79.

“Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, his younger brother, who is in about the tenth year of his age, being the next in the line of succession, has, by the President and Council, been recognised, and orders have been transmitted to the Resident at the Durbar to assist the Ministers in seating him with the usual formalities on the musnud, which is a measure we hope will prove the most consistent with your intentions, as well as with the meaning of the tenth paragraph of your general letter of the 16th March, 1768, and is also a popular election in the eyes of the Natives.”\*

It was in the “general letter of the 16th March, 1768,” that the Directors had declared their “inviolable attachment” to the Nawab and “his family”, whose maintenance was “very essential to the stability of Government,” and had directed the Governor and Council at Calcutta “never to reduce the stipend lower.”†

But another crisis was now approaching in the relations between the Nawab and the Company. Another succession,—the third within four years,—with another and longer minority, offered an irresistible temptation to the managing partner. The sanguine expectations of Clive as to the surplus revenues of Bengal had not been realised. At the termination of Mr. Verelst’s government in 1769, it was found that the income had failed to meet the current expenses. At the same time the Court of Directors were pressed very hard by the King’s Ministry. The Company became bound by two successive Acts of Parliament to pay a tribute from India to the Imperial Treasury of £400,000 per annum, first for two years, and afterwards for five years, commencing in February 1769. And while their financial exigencies were increasing, their political difficulties in India had very much diminished. The Governor and Council at Calcutta began to feel the ground firm under their feet. Both in Bengal and in England it was clear that the money must be had somehow; it was quite clear, also, that the Nawab,—a boy ten years old,—might easily be made to pay his share of it.

Accordingly, in a new Treaty between the Governor and Council and the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowla, dated the 21st of March, 1770, identical in other respects with

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), pp. 17, 18.

† *Ante*, pp. 32, 33.

that concluded with his predecessor, the annual stipend for the support of the Nawab's household and retinue is reduced from £418,000 to £318,000.\*

Even this reduction of £100,000 per annum did not satisfy the Court of Directors, as appears in the following extract from their letter of the 10th of April, 1771 :

“ We cannot but observe with astonishment that an event of so much importance as the death of the Nabob Syef-ood-Dowlah, and the establishment of a successor in so great a degree of non-age, should not have been attended with those advantages for the Company which such a circumstance offered to your view.

“ We mean not here to disapprove the preserving the succession in the family of Meer Jaffier ; on the contrary, both justice and policy recommend a measure which at once corresponds with the customs and inclinations of the people of Bengal ; but when we consider the state of the new Soubah” (Nawab) “ we know not on what grounds it could have been thought necessary to continue to him the stipend allotted to his adult predecessor.”†

They consider that “ an allowance of sixteen lacs per annum” (£160,000) “ will be sufficient for the support of the Nawab's state and rank, while yet a minor.” This is a remarkable change from their despatch of the 16th of March, 1768, when they desired that the Nawab's income should never be again reduced,‡ but still their objection is only based upon the new Soubah's “ nonage ;” the reduced allowance is only considered sufficient for him, “ while yet a minor ;” and in paragraph 41 of the same despatch they state distinctly that “ the reduction of the Nawab's stipend is adventitious and temporary.”§

The reduced allowance, however, was not raised, when the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah attained his majority, to the amount stipulated in the Treaty of 1770. By that time the pecuniary wants of the Company had grown even more rapidly than their power and influence. During the administration of Warren Hastings it was determined, without apology or explanation, that the “ adventitious and temporary reduction” in the Nawab's income should

\* From Rs. 41,86,131 as. 9 to Rs. 31,81,991 as. 9. *Papers, Nawab Nazim of Bengal* (No. 371 of 1870), p. 15.

† *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 18.

‡ *Ante*, p. 33.

§ *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 19.

be considered as a permanent reduction. At the reduced amount of sixteen lakhs of rupees per annum (£160,000) the revenue of the Nizamut has been accounted for ever since; and though, as we shall see, the amount paid directly to the Nawab Nazim has been gradually lessened by a very ingenious process, each Nawab, from Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah down to his fifth successor, the present Nawab Munsoor Ali Khan, has been made to sign every month a receipt for the full monthly instalment of the annual sum of £160,000.

Notwithstanding the arbitrary diminution of the annual allowance for the support of the Nawab's dignity, and other indications of an approaching change, the system of double government was not altered on the accession of Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah. Although it began to be urged with increasing force and reason that the Company ought "to stand forth openly and immediately in their own name as Dewan," Mahomed Reza Khan still filled the joint office of Naib Dewan and Naib Nazim,—the former giving him full authority for the collection of the revenues in the name of the Company, the latter giving him, beyond the walls of Calcutta, the whole executive authority in the name of the Nawab,—with a salary of £90,000 per annum. Warren Hastings, appointed Governor-General in 1772, was not the man to brook such a rival near his throne. Within four months after his arrival, armed with the secret instructions and promised support of the Court of Directors, he arrested Mahomed Reza Khan and suspended him from his high offices. In spite of the wholesale subornation of evidence by Hastings' agent and ally—soon to be his victim,—the Brahmin Nuncomar, the integrity of Mahomed Reza Khan, after a lengthened and searching inquiry, proved quite unimpeachable. As a last resort, when pressed by a vote of the majority in Council and the orders of the Home Government, Warren Hastings, on the 23rd of July, 1778, produced a letter from the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, complaining of Mahomed Reza, and claiming that as he had now attained his twentieth year, which by Mussulman law was that of majority, he should be set free from the oppressive tute-

lage of a person not bound to him by any ties of nature or affection. In urging that the Nawab's request should be immediately complied with, Hastings argued that "his demands are grounded on positive rights which will not admit of discussion." He went on to say that the Nawab "has an incontestible right to the Nizamut; it is his by inheritance; the dependants of the Nizamut Adawlut" (the administration of justice) "and of the Foujdarry" (criminal law and police) "have been repeatedly declared by the Company and by this Government to appertain to the Nizamut." The decision of the Court of Directors was given in a letter dated the 4th of February, 1779:—"As we have no reason to alter our opinion of Mahomed Reza Khan, we positively direct that you forthwith signify to the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah our pleasure that Mahomed Reza Khan be immediately restored to the office of Naib Soubahdar."

The prosecution of the Naib Nazim ostensibly failed, but its object was nevertheless attained. During the six years of Mahomed Reza Khan's suspension, Mr. Middleton was appointed to take charge of his office; the covenanted servants who, since 1769, had superintended the receipts and disbursements of revenue in each district, under the name of Supervisors, were now denominated Collectors and invested with direct authority. Every day dispelled some imagined mystery of Indian administration, brought more dexterity to the Company's officers in the details of local management, and accustomed the Natives of all classes to the open and visible exercise of British domination. Thus in 1779 when Mahomed Reza Khan was at last reinstated in the post of Naib Nazim, his occupation was almost gone. He was now evidently destined to become at no distant day a sinecurist like his master. The chief places in every branch of the public service, the judicial department alone excepted, were filled by English gentlemen. Mahomedan judges, in subordination to the Nawab or his Deputy, still administered criminal justice, on principles drawn from the Koran. The general administration of justice, indeed, when the public revenue was not immediately concerned, was considered to be be-

yond the province of the Company as Dewan, "to appertain," in the words of Warren Hastings,\* to the Nizamut." But everywhere symptoms of the final transition were apparent. During the suspension of Mahomed Reza Khan, for example, the Nizamut Adawlut or chief Court of appeal for Bengal, Behar and Orissa, was removed from Moorshedabad, the Nawab's capital, to Calcutta, the capital of the Company, where another Court of civil jurisdiction was also established, called the Dewanee Adawlut. The names of these two Courts may be said to be the last traces of the double government of Dewan Company and Nawab Nazim that lingered until 1862, when the High Court of Bengal was instituted.

All possibility of any political or executive action of the Nawab Nazim, either in person or by means of his Minister, was definitively precluded in 1793 by Lord Cornwallis's judicial reforms, when the office of the Naib Nazim was abolished. The double government then really came to an end, and the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, may then be said to have become a mediatised Prince, having no voice in the administration. The Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah died in 1796.

We have already pointed out the error committed by Sir Charles Wood in his despatch of 17th June, 1864, in throwing the acquisition of the Dewanee of Bengal by the Company, eight years back to the time of the Treaty with Meer Jaffier.† In the same despatch, and in the speech of Mr. Grant Duff on the 4th of July, 1871, another error, equally injurious to the present Nawab's cause, is committed in considerably throwing back the date of the assumption by the East India Company of those executive and administrative duties that had previously been left to the Nawab Nazim. In paragraph IV of the despatch above-mentioned, Sir Charles Wood admits that it was "one of the conditions of the grant of the Dewanee that provision should be made for the expenses of the Nizamut,"—"that is," he continues, "that a part of the revenues of those Provinces should be appropriated to the payment of the department of the administration

\* *Ante*, p. 38.

† *Ante*, p. 28.

distinguished by that official name." And so far he is quite right; if he will only remember that in that department, and at the head of it, there was a certain person called the Nawab Nazim, to whom the Company was bound by special ties, over and above the conditions imposed by the King. In the play of Hamlet do not let the part of Hamlet be left out. "But subsequently," he adds, beginning to wander, "by special arrangements, the Company undertook to perform the duties of the Nizamut, and made provision for its expenses by paying their own servants to do the work which had before been done by the servants of the Nazim."

Then in paragraph V of the same despatch Sir Charles Wood says :—

"The administrative duties of the Nizamut having been transferred to the Company, a personal provision was made for the family of the Nazim. It was right that consideration should be shown to the sons of Meer Jaffir Ali, though they were not called upon, after the death of the eldest, Nudjum-ood-Dowlah, to discharge the high official duties of the Soobadar or Viceroy of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa."

Here is a complication of serious and most misleading mistakes. The "personal provision for the family of the Nazim," was made long before "the administrative duties," were "transferred to the Company," and quite irrespective of the transfer, which, in fact, was not at that time contemplated. He is quite wrong in saying that "after the death of the eldest, Nudjum-ood-Dowlah," the sons of Meer Jaffier Ali were not called upon to discharge the duties of Nazim. The two younger sons, Syef-ood-Dowlah and Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, were both minors when they succeeded to the musnud, —and the former died before attaining his majority.—but the high functions of the Nawab Soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, were performed for them, and in their names, by their Minister or Deputy, the Naib Nazim. The minority of these two Princes in succession undoubtedly facilitated gradual innovations, and smoothed the way for the final transfer, but this was not completed, as we have just seen, till 1793.

And neither at the completion of the transfer, when

the office of Naib Nazim was discontinued, nor at any intermediate stage in the process, had the Company to make any additional "provision for expenses". The Company of course paid "their own servants to do the work" out of the revenues of Bengal, as it had previously paid "the servants of the Nazim" out of the same revenues, which it administered as Dewan.

Surely Sir Charles Wood was not under the delusion that the Nawab Nazim paid for all the judicial, police and executive establishments of the three Provinces, while they were under his direction, out of the stipend assigned personally to him for his "household expenses," and for his retinue and "the support of" his "dignity only".\*

At every stage in the gradual process of transfer, and at the final stage in 1793, far from there being additional expense, there was a saving, for the double set of officials—the Nazim's doing the work, the Dewan's controlling and supervising,—was reduced to a single set; and although Lord Cornwallis considerably raised the previously nominal salaries of the Company's English officers, not one of them received such an income as had been allotted to the chief Native official under the double government, the Naib Nazim, amounting to £90,000 a year.

When Sir Charles Wood, in the passage last quoted, declares that "it was right that consideration should be shown to the sons of Meer Jaffir Ali," and adds that "accordingly, treaties were entered into with the younger Princes, Syef-ood-Dowlah and Moobaruk-ood-Dowlah successively, by which the Company undertook to secure to them the Soobadaree of the Provinces of Bengal, &c., and to pay them a certain annual stipend," such a very inadequate reference to the Treaties of 1766 and 1770 amounts to a falsification of history. The Secretary of State speaks as if these Treaties were made solely out of "consideration" for "the sons of Meer Jaffir," as if in those days the alliance with them offered no political advantage to the Company. In the first place, the two younger brothers, in Article I of the Treaties of 1766 and 1770,

\* *Ante*, p. 27.

“ratify and confirm” the previous Treaties made with their elder brother and father, whereby they assume, and the English Company recognise, their possession of the same sovereign rights and prerogatives as their predecessors. In the Treaty of 1765, which the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah “ratified” in 1770, the grant of certain districts in Bengal were confirmed to the Company, and also the privileges of carrying on trade, free, with the exception of salt, from all duties and taxes, and of coining money; in Article XII the Nawab promises to “confirm and abide by the Treaty made with the Dutch”; and in Article XIII he declares that “if the French come into the country,” he “will not allow them to erect fortifications or maintain forces,”\*—all of which are stipulations that could not have been made with any but a Sovereign authority and which no authority less than that of a Sovereign could have been called upon to ratify and confirm.

Thus it is utterly untrue that the Treaties of 1766 and 1770, were only concluded out of “consideration” for “the sons of Meer Jaffier Ali”. Besides the ratification of all former gains and acquisitions, the Company obtained this additional advantage by those two Treaties, that in them each of the younger brothers in succession consented to receive a smaller annual sum for his household expenses and the support of his dignity, than that for which his predecessor had stipulated.

And this is the true mode of accounting for and explaining the fact that successive Treaties were made with the sons of Meer Jaffier Ali,—not because each Treaty was designed, or supposed, or desired to hold good only for the life of the Nawab signing it, but because at each demise the Company saw what they considered a good opportunity for gaining some additional advantage, and wished to preserve a regular and continuous title to all their acquisitions by means of a chain of recorded charters.

The notion of claiming the territorial dominion of Bengal, or of attempting to rule without—in the words of Lord Clive,†—“the sanction of a Soubah,” had never been broached by any Anglo-Indian statesman in 1770.

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, pp. 59, 60.

† *Ante*, p. 34.

By the sanction and with the assistance of the Nawab the Company obtained the Dewannee. By means of the Dewannee the Company gradually relieved the Nawabs Nazim of all their executive functions. The new doctrine is that the Nawabs Nazim, having parted with their political power, lost thereby all right to the Princely dignity and to that personal provision, for which, when parting with political power, they had expressly stipulated.

But this new doctrine has been held and explained by several official authorities on several occasions, on grounds equally untenable and irreconcilable with each other. Lord Dalhousie, the original teacher, was content with alleging that all the Treaties were "purely personal agreements which expired with the individual with whom each was concluded, and that they were not renewed after the death of Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah in 1796".\*

The Government of India, in their despatch of the 29th of July, 1870, adopt Lord Dalhousie's views, as quoted above, but also declare that Bengal was acquired from the Nawab Nazim by conquest,—“in substance and fact as much a case of conquest as the conquest of the Punjab. The fact,” continues the despatch, “that the conquest was effected peaceably, because the force of the Company was irresistible, no more prevented it from being a conquest, than the fact that the Danes offered no resistance to the occupation of Serampore prevented that occupation from being a conquest; and the conquest, however effected, put an end to all independence on the part of the Nawab, and, therefore, according to one of the most familiar principles of international law, to all Treaties between him and his conquerors”.†

It is nothing less than a monstrous perversion of language and historical truth to call the gradual transfer of executive power from the Nawab to the Company a “conquest,” and to say that the English were the “conquerors” of their Ally. From first to last there was no quarrel; there were no hostilities. Every step in the gradation was either marked by some formal document

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 3. † *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4.

under the seal and sign manual of the reigning Nawab, or sanctioned by his acquiescence, of which the East India Company and its apologists have always made the most. Thus Mr. Grant Duff in his speech of the 4th of July, 1871, after mentioning the arbitrary reduction of the Nawab's income after the Treaty of 1770,\* says:—"Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, like a man of sense" (he was ten years old at his accession,) "accepted accomplished facts without even a protest, and was very glad to keep his £160,000 a year for his life".

And the Government of India in the despatch just quoted of 29th July, 1870, (paragraph IX) point out what they consider to be an "inference" that the Nawab must have "overlooked" in adducing documentary proof of the Princely rank and prerogative of his ancestors, viz: "that the higher he raises their position, the more weight does he attach to the acquiescence of himself and his ancestors to the arrangement under which they lived".†

Too much weight cannot be attached to the acquiescence of the Nawabs, but then if their acquiescence be pleaded,—and assuredly it cannot be disputed,—it is absurd and disingenuous to bring forward the plea of "conquest". If the Nawabs have acquiesced, surely they are entitled to the benefit of their acquiescence. Nor has the acquiescence been all on one side. If the Nawabs have acquiesced in their own mediatisation, the British Government has acquiesced by a series of Proclamations on the accession of each Nawab, by Acts of the Legislature and by innumerable formal documents issued by the highest authorities, in the Princely rank of the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, and in the hereditary tenure of his dignity and revenue. And if complete acquiescence on both sides for an entire century, and during five successions, does not constitute a case of prescriptive right, very scanty grounds will be left for confidence or hope in the stability of their position to many other Indian dignitaries, and a great stain of bad faith and broken compact will be cast on the British title to Bengal. How was our title acquired?

Most certainly the process by which the East India

\* *Ante*, p. 39.

† *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 4.

Company acquired the virtual sovereignty of Bengal cannot properly be called "conquest." Let us take the most recent official description of the first step in that process, as given in "*Aitchison's Treaties*".

"A confederacy was formed among Suraj-ood-Dowla's chief officers to depose him. The English joined this confederacy, and concluded a Treaty with Jaffier Ali Khan.

"At the battle of Plassy, which was fought on the 23rd of June, 1757, the power of Suraj-ood-Dowla was completely broken, and Jaffier Ali Khan was installed by Clive as Subadar of Bengal."\*

A confederacy with Native nobles and ministers, and a campaign carried on chiefly with Native troops, ending in the installation of a Native Prince, can hardly be called a conquest. The subsequent steps in the process—the grant of the Dewannee by the Emperor, and the Treaties by which each Nawab in succession was induced to divest himself of some portion of his power and of his income—do not amount to a conquest. It is manifest from the contemporary records that the British authorities could at no time between 1757 and 1800 have obtained the sovereignty of Bengal by any exertion or display of open force that was possible for them. Even for their military operations and political transactions they required a great amount of Native support and co-operation. For administrative and fiscal purposes, Native support and co-operation were still more requisite. The Nawab Nazim may have been, as has been often said, our creature, a mere political instrument, but still he was an indispensable political instrument. Without the Nawab on our side, as a visible symbol of order and legality, as a link between the East India Company and the Mogul Emperor, there would have been imminent danger of a coalition of Princes and a rising of the people against our undisguised encroachments and our mysterious designs. As our power grew more secure, the support and countenance of the Nawab became less necessary. The demands and acquisitions of the East India Company gradually increased, and are marked by the successive Treaties.

Mr. Grant Duff in his speech of the 4th July, 1871,

\* *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1862, vol. i, p. 3.

employs both of the official pleas against the rights of the Nizamut family that he found on record,—the plea of “conquest” and the plea of “personal” Treaties. He puts the date of the “conquest” at least as far back as the grant of the Dewannee, for he says it was only “nominally handed over to the English Company,”—“for of course we took it, and the Nizamut too, by our own good swords”. And in another passage he says that “in the years from 1771 to 1782 Bengal was conquered by Warren Hastings, —peacefully conquered, but still more thoroughly conquered than Delhi was by Tamerlane”. No statement could well be more erroneous, whether the question is viewed as a matter of history or of political science. As well might King William III be said to have conquered Great Britain. The English Company no more gained the upper hand of Suraj-ood-Dowlah in 1757, or obtained the Dewannee in 1765 by their “own good swords,” than William of Orange obtained the Crown in 1688 by his own good sword. Clive had a handful of British soldiers, and a gallant company of British officers,—just as William had his Dutch troops, a complete little army, 10,000 strong—who formed the soul and spirit of the force he led, and without whom he could have done nothing. But with them he could have done nothing, either in 1757 or in 1765,—just as William could have done nothing with his Dutch Guards in 1688,—without a much larger body of Native troops, without Native sympathy and Native assistance. Unless that confederacy to depose Suraj-ood-Dowlah, whose tyranny had become intolerable, had been formed among his chief officers,—unless Clive had secured the defection at the critical moment, and the subsequent co-operation, of a leading member of the Nawab’s family like Meer Jaffier Ali, with a strong party in the Durbar and the army,—he could no more have deposed Suraj-ood-Dowlah, than William could have deposed James II without the concert and co-operation of the leading English statesmen.

If we make every allowance for differences of latitude and race, and for dissimilar stages of civilisation,—if we acknowledge that a Durbar is not a Parliament, and that

the military and political manœuvres of the English Company were not guided purely by a disinterested regard for the internal good of Bengal,—still the parallel between the events from 1688 to 1690 in these islands, and from 1757 to 1765 in Bengal will be sufficiently complete for us to say that there are no elements of “conquest” in either of them.

A dynastic revolution introduced the British officers who took part in it into the very heart of the Native State, and hampered the Nawab by pecuniary exactions, complicated obligations, and demands which were incessantly growing, and which he could neither satisfy fully, nor reconcile with the good of his country. Still British domination, and even British power in any shape, was precarious in Bengal for some years,—the consciousness of which is plainly enough expressed in the formula observed in all the Treaties, except the last of 1770, that they should be “inviolably observed, *as long as the English Company's factories continue in Bengal,*”\*—and all the steps taken to secure British domination up to the acquisition of the Dewannee in 1765, were, according to the customs and precedents of India, legal and constitutional.

The British title to Bengal, Behar and Orissa, is not derived from conquest, but from a series of Treaties and transactions with the Nawabs, confirmed, no doubt, but only confirmed—not superseded or rendered superfluous,—by the submission and obedience of the inhabitants; and anyone who tampers with the reserved rights of the Nawab, under any pretext whatever, attacks the British title, and deserves the name neither of a statesman nor a jurist.

But the official authorities at Calcutta, and Mr. Grant Duff in the House of Commons, have two darts prepared, and in case the plea of conquest should miss its mark, they bring forward the weapon of “a personal Treaty,” used so freely and with such fatal effect by Lord Dalhousie for the destruction of our faithful and docile dependencies. Mr. Grant Duff, referring to the

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, pp. 49, 66, 67.

series of Treaties with the Nawabs Nazim, says that "it must be perfectly clear to anyone who takes the trouble to read these Treaties, that they are simply and solely personal agreements, made for the life of particular persons by whom they were signed."

"The particular persons by whom they were signed" were "the Governor and Council" of Calcutta, whose names are appended in full, on the one part, and the Nawab on the other part. Mr. Grant Duff does not, we may assume, mean that these Treaties were to last only as long as the lives of the English gentlemen who signed them. But why not? Because, it would be replied, they signed on behalf of the English East India Company, which was a Corporation with the right of perpetual succession. Certainly,—and the Nawab signed as representative of the Nizamut, the perpetuity of which consisted in its hereditary tenure, continuously acknowledged and repeatedly asserted by the East India Company from 1757 down to the accession of the present Nawab Nazim in 1838.\*

But still it may be urged, in the words of several official despatches and speeches, that, after all, each Treaty is only made for the life of a particular person. That is by no means the case. No such words occur in any one of the Treaties with the Nawabs Nazim.

The Governor and Council at Calcutta, representing the East India Company, knew perfectly well how to make a Treaty or Agreement for one life only. One such document will be found among the Bengal Treaties. It is dated the 27th of September, 1760, and is concluded between Meer Mahomed Cossim Khan and the English Company. This is the Meer Cossim of whom Mr. Grant Duff erroneously says in his speech that when "Meer Jaffier Ali gave umbrage to his British masters," "he was brushed aside," "one Meer Cossim was put in his stead," and afterwards, "he, too, was brushed aside, and Meer Jaffier replaced in the enjoyment of his dignity, such as it was." The fact is, that in the agreement with Meer Cossim it was expressly stipulated that "the Nawab,

\* *Ante*, pp. 17, 18.

Meer Mahomed Jaffier Ali Khan Behauder, *shall continue in possession of his dignities*, and all affairs be transacted in his name." Meer Cossim was not "put" in Meer Jaffier Ali's "stead"; he was not recognised as Nawab Nazim, but only appointed to be Naib Nazim—the same office held subsequently for many years by Mahomed Reza Khan,\*—and this Deputyship or "Nēabut of the Soubadarry" was to be held, and "this Agreement to remain in force" only "*during the life of Meer Mahomed Cossim Khan.*"†

No such limitation will be found in any one of the Treaties with the successive Nawabs Nazim.

When Mr. Grant Duff so confidently asserted that the Treaties of 1765, 1766, and 1770 were "only for the life of the then Nawab," of the Nawab in whose name it was concluded, he must, equally with Lord Dalhousie when he pronounced them to be "purely personal agreements which expired with the individual with whom each was concluded,"‡ have forgotten the manifest fact that not one of them ceased and expired with the life of the individual with whom it was concluded, for the very simple reason that in the first Article of each of these Treaties, the original Treaty with Meer Jaffier and every subsequent Treaty are ratified and confirmed,§ while the last of the series, that of 1770, in which all the previous Treaties are recited for confirmation, is to "be inviolably observed for ever."|| Thus the Treaties are inseparably connected from the first to the last, and the last is a perpetual Treaty.

All these mistaken views as to personal Treaties rest upon two palpable errors, which disappear at once if reference is made to the established principles of International Law. The first error is that a Treaty becomes a "personal Treaty," if it is made with a Prince by name, and does not contain the words "heirs and successors". The

\* *Ante*, p. 31.

† *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. i, pp. 46, 47.

‡ *Ante*, p. 43.

§ *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), pp. 12, 14, 15.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 16.

second error is that the meaning of the term "personal Treaty," is a Treaty made for one life only.

The fact is that a Treaty may contain the words "heirs and successors," in every Article and clause, and yet be a "personal Treaty", while the absence of those words from a Treaty may not in the least detract from the perpetuity of its obligations on both sides. "Treaties," says Vattel, "that are perpetual, and those made for a determinate time, are real; since their duration does not depend on the lives of the contracting parties."\* And Grotius points out that it is not necessary that the words "heirs and successors" "should be introduced in order to make the Treaty real".†

The same great jurist also says:—"If it be added to the Treaty that *it shall stand for ever*, or that it is made *for the good of the Kingdom*, it will from hence fully appear that the Treaty is *real*."‡ It is "added to the Treaty" of 1770 that "this Agreement, by the blessing of God, *shall be inviolably observed for ever*". In Article II the Nawab declares that he commits the executive power in the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa to the English East India Company, "having an entire confidence" that it will promote "my honour, interest *and the good of my country*," and that it will operate "*for the better conducting the affairs of the Soubahdarry*".§ Thus both of the stipulations, either of which, according to Grotius, would suffice to make the Treaty "real," are contained in the Treaty of 1770.

But for deciding as to the permanence of the Treaty of 1770, the question of "real" or "personal" is in fact immaterial. It may be personal and permanent.

A "personal" Treaty is not necessarily or usually a Treaty made for one life only. It is a Treaty made for the private objects and interests of a Prince or *family*, and to last as long as the person or *the family* last. Even an undoubted "personal" Treaty would not expire, for want

\* Book II, chap. xii, § 187.

† *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. II, chap. xv.

‡ *Ibid.*, chap. xvi. See also Vattel, paragraphs 187, 189.

§ *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 15.

of the words, "heirs and successors," at the death of the individual named in it, if its evident object was to secure certain advantages to his family.

The Treaty of 1770, as we have seen, has some characteristics of a "real" Treaty, but if it were ever so "personal," it would remain in force as long as any member of the Nizamut family existed. According to Von Martens:—

"Treaties, properly so called, are either *personal* or *real*. They are personal, when their continuation in force depends on the person of the sovereign (*or his family*), with whom they have been contracted. They are real, when their duration depends on the State, independently of the person who contracts. All treaties made for a time specified, or for ever, are also real."\*

The Treaty of 1770 is made "for ever", and therefore, whether considered "real" or not, must have been intended by the contracting parties to last as long as the Nawab's family on the one side, and the East India Company on the other, should continue in existence.

A Treaty such as we have made at different times in India, granting a pension as reward or compensation to a Prince or family, is a personal Treaty, and in some cases, also, a Treaty for a life only, or for lives. Under Treaties of this sort we settled certain annual payments on Dowlut Rao Scindia and some ladies of his family.† The Treaty made by the Duke of Wellington with Amrut Rao, and the terms of capitulation between Sir John Malcolm and Bajee Rao, the last Peishwa,‡ are also instances of personal Treaties which are good for a life only.

Wheaton, perhaps the greatest of modern authorities, writes as follows on the same subject:—

"Treaties are divided into *personal* and *real*. The former relate exclusively to the persons of the contracting parties, such as family alliances, and treaties guaranteeing the throne to a particular Sovereign and his family. They expire, of course, on the death of the King, *or the extinction of his family*."§

The Nizamut family is not extinct. The present Na-

\* *Law of Nations*, translated from G. F. Von Martens, London, 1803, p. 54.

† *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. iv, p. 245.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 90 and 183.

§ *Elements of International Law*, Boston, 1855, p. 39.

wab Nazim is the fifth in succession, directly descended in the male line from Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, with whom the Treaty of 1770 was concluded, and the eighth Nawab in succession from Meer Jaffier Ali Khan with whom the confederacy was formed against Suraj-ood-Dowlah, which was the origin of our power in Bengal.

The new doctrine of a "personal Treaty" was not broached until five successions had taken place to the Princely dignity and the annual income enjoyed by the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah, with whom that Treaty of 1770 was concluded, which was to be "inviolably observed for ever". It was not broached until 1853, and then only as one secretly proposed item in a general scheme of annexation and confiscation, the main pivot and working principle of which was that Treaties "to be inviolably observed for ever",—"perpetual" Treaties,—Treaties "to last as long as the Sun and Moon endure", were each of them in turn declared to be mere "personal" Treaties, good only for the life of the weaker contracting party, whose descendants became after the first demise mere "recipients of the bounty" of the stronger contracting party. The East India Company was an immortal corporation: such terms as "to be inviolably observed for ever," "perpetual," "to last as long as the Sun and Moon endure," applied only to *their* possessions or acquisitions, and the concessions made to *them*. A Rajah of Mysore or a Nawab Nazim of Bengal, although he may have been accustomed to suppose his rank and station hereditary, was only an individual, and any reservations, made on his behalf, or on behalf of his family, were in their nature transitory, contingent on the grace and favour of the stronger party towards the individual representative for the time being of the weaker party.

When this new doctrine was first set forth in 1848,—when the "Calcutta Government", in the words of Sir George Clerk's Dissent against the annexation of Mysore, "led off with that flagrant instance of the barefaced appropriation of Sattara",\* Mr. Willoughby, then a Member

\* *Mysore Papers* (112 of 1866), p. 72.

of Council at Bombay,\* whose Minute was eulogised by Lord Dalhousie as "a text-book", recommended the annexation "on financial grounds". After noticing the annual deficits for several years, "it cannot with truth be said," he argued, "that the ultimate reversion into the general exchequer of India of a revenue which may hereafter vary from £120,000 to £140,000, is of no importance".†

The young Governor-General employed the same plea. "I take this fitting\* occasion," he said, "of recording my strong and deliberate opinion that, in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory *or revenue* as may from time to time present themselves".‡

And when the question came before the Home authorities, Lord Dalhousie's proposal met with warm support on the same grounds from a very able retired Bengal Civilian, Mr. R. D. Mangles, who, in the Court of Directors, in the House of Commons, in the Council of India, and in the columns of the *Edinburgh Review*, has ever since persistently advocated a policy of confiscation for India. "We have practically the whole of India," he urged, "to govern and to defend, whether its provinces be immediately administered by British officers or by nominal Sovereigns. Our means are too small for the full and efficient discharge of these functions; the people have not so good a government as they are justly entitled to; and we are consequently bound to avail ourselves of every just opportunity for increasing our financial resources."§

The principle being thus announced and accepted, such "just opportunities," such "rightful opportunities," for securing "those ultimate reversions" that were expected to prove so lucrative, were very soon found. The friendly, influential, and docile States of Sattara, Nagpore, Jhansi and Oude were swept away. The mediatised Principality of the Nawab of the Carnatic was declared not to be

\* Afterwards Sir J. P. Willoughby, Bart., and a Member of the Secretary of State's Council of India.

† *Sattara Papers* (83 of 1849), p. 73.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1849, p. 83.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

hereditary, and succession was refused to a lineal male descendant of our oldest and most serviceable Ally. Another mediatised Principality in Southern India, that of the Rajah of Tanjore, was extinguished by the rejection of a collateral adopted heir. Every one of these cases of annexation was accompanied by a shameless confiscation of private property, and the scandalous public sale of jewels, clothes and household furniture.

Our good friend, the Nizam of Hyderabad, had been induced—"compelled" would perhaps be the more correct word,—by the dominant influence of our Government, to maintain for more than fifty years a Contingent Force, controlled by our Resident and commanded by our officers, whose emoluments, costing our Government nothing, were swelled to a scale of preposterous extravagance. "The commands and staff-appointments" (in this Force) says Major Moore, one of the Court of Directors, "have afforded rewards for meritorious officers who had distinguished themselves in our own armies; and it has been altogether a fertile source of patronage". On the other hand, while we imposed this "incubus on the Nizam's finances," we turned these troops to our own pecuniary benefit in another way. Relying upon the Contingent for preserving peace and good order in the Nizam's dominions, we "disregarded our own engagements", and "for thirty years the number of our troops", the Subsidiary Force, "kept up within the Hyderabad country, was more than one fourth less than the number for which we had contracted" under the Treaty of 1800, in return for valuable cessions of territory.

"Overwhelmed with financial difficulties," he continues, "the Nizam was at length unable to pay the Contingent, and we kindly lent him the money from our own treasury, first at 12 per cent., and latterly at 6 per cent. interest; and thus our staunch Ally incurred a debt to us of about 50 lakhs of rupees" (£500,000).\*

Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad, who had been Assistant Resident in 1853, when the Revised Treaty was extorted from the Nizam, as he says, "by

\* *Papers, Nizam's Debt*, 1859, pp. 4, 5, 9, 11, 16, 17.

objurgations and threats", declares that "had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just claim against the Nizam. "In 1853", he says in the next paragraph of the same despatch, dated the 12th of October, 1860, "we had little or no real pecuniary claim against the Nizam". He points out that if that Prince's case had received fair consideration, he could have shown "a credit" against us to the full amount, without interest, of the debt charged against him, a great part of which was made up of interest, while "since 1853 we have charged 18 lakhs of rupees" (£180,000) "for the interest of the debt of 43 lakhs", (£430,000) "which his Highness acknowledged, under pressure, to be due by him by the Treaty of 1853, but which he never considered he justly owed". After noticing the monstrous demand that had been annually brought against the Nizam's Government of £130,000 as the pay alone of the English officers of the Contingent,\* Colonel Davidson observes:—"The wonder clearly is that instead of owing only 43 lakhs of Company's rupees at the end of fifty years of such a system, our claim did not render the Nizam hopelessly insolvent".†

Taking advantage of this most questionable debt—most questionable, even if the Nizam's large counter-claims were excluded,—Lord Dalhousie extorted from the Nizam in 1853, by means of menace and compulsion, the assignment of some of his finest Provinces—about a quarter of his dominions—to British administration, as a material guaranty for the regular payment of the Contingent Force, which we had most unfairly and insidiously rendered permanent, contrary to the principle of the old Treaty, and altered under the new Treaty, while its annual expense was reduced, so as to make it useful and always available for our own purposes.‡

\* The average pay of each officer down to 1853 was about £1500 a year. At the head of the list were five Brigadiers, commanding what were called "Divisions" in this Force numbering about 7000 of all ranks. The emoluments of a Brigadier were about £3000 per annum, and to each of the five "Divisions" there was a Brigade Major, a Paymaster, and a Superintending Surgeon, all paid at proportionate rates.

† *Papers, The Deccan* (338 of 1867), pp. 27, 28.

‡ By a new Treaty, dated 31st December, 1860, as a reward for the

Financial advantages having been put prominently forward as one of the chief objects of the policy of territorial extension, Lord Dalhousie, in the Farewell "Minute Reviewing his Administration," boasted of having added by his annexations "four millions sterling to the annual revenue of the Empire," even including in this alleged addition, £500,000 from these Assigned Districts of Hyderabad, held in trust for the Nizam,\* not one penny of which could fall into the British Treasury, since we were bound, after paying for the Contingent and the costs of administration, to hand over the surplus to the Nizam.

In the Legislative Council at Calcutta on the 5th March, 1867, Mr. Massey, then Financial Member of the Government, stated that "the revenues of East and West Berar, commonly called the Assigned Districts, like the revenues of Mysore, were collected and administered in trust for the Native Government (the Nizam's), and had properly no place in the Indian accounts".

This is an extreme example of the delusive style in which Lord Dalhousie drew up his self-laudatory Farewell Minute, because here he had not acquired the sovereignty or the beneficial possession of the Assigned Districts, but merely the right of management for a specific purpose; and on a general examination of his flourishing financial summary, we find that Lord Dalhousie only gave the gross receipts of his territorial acquisitions, and said nothing at all about the new expenditure, which in every instance far exceeded the new receipts. In the eight years of his administration he added £8,354,000 to the public debt: in the three last of these years there was a

Nizam's help during the rebellion, and "to mark the high esteem in which his Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen", a partial restoration was made of the Assigned Districts,—the Berar Provinces being still retained to provide for the Contingent,—and the balance of alleged debt was remitted. The Nizam's large counter-claims were, however, left untouched, and some valuable territorial cessions were taken from his Highness with only the nominal equivalent of Shorapore, which had never, in fact, ceased to be part of the Nizam's Dominions.—*Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. v, pp. 114, 116.

\* *Papers, Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie*, February 28th, 1856, paragraph 19 (note), p. 7.

heavy deficit, amounting in 1853-4, though India was at peace, to £2,044,000, and in 1854-5 to £1,850,000.

During the great rebellion, the immediate offspring of Lord Dalhousie's demoralising and exasperating injustice,—which broke out with the Sepoy mutiny in 1857, and was not finally suppressed until 1859,—it became necessary to augment the British forces in India to the enormous number of 122,000 men; of whom 35,000 disappeared entirely from the muster-rolls in those three years, having either died or been discharged from wounds or ruined constitutions; and during the same three years upwards of forty millions sterling were added to the public debt of India. Thus did Lord Dalhousie's policy "consolidate our military strength," and "add to the resources of the public treasury."

But besides the extinction of Native States, the destruction of royal families, and the abolition of mediatised Principalities, under the Dalhousie administration, many steps were taken and special measures passed,—with the same rude notion of acquiring revenue somehow,—that were eminently calculated to lower the position, and destroy the public career of great nobles and proprietors. At later periods and by different processes, varying in the several Presidencies, in the Punjab, and in Oude, the Native landed aristocracy saw ruin, immediate or prospective, brought to their doors by new-fangled revenue settlements, resumption laws, and Inam Commissions, instituted or intensified by Lord Dalhousie, strenuously supported by "the Services," speaking through the *Friend of India*, and the Mangles party in the Court of Directors. But even when they lost property or income, the natural leaders of the people did not lose their influence. The masses found no cause for gratitude towards the British Government. They everywhere not only sympathised but suffered with the despoiled landlords. This was most remarkably and conspicuously testified in Oude, though it was made evident enough, also, in many parts of the North West Provinces. Lord Canning in a despatch dated 17th June, 1858, thus expresses his astonishment at the unaccountable fact

“that the endeavour to neutralize the usurped and largely abused power of the Talookdars by recognising the supposed proprietary right of the people, and thus arousing their feelings of self-interest and evoking their gratitude, had failed utterly”.

“The village occupants, as a body, relapsed into their former subjection to the Talookdar”, or great landlord, “owned and obeyed his authority as if he had been their lawful Suzerain, and joined the ranks of those who rose up in arms against the British Government”.\*

The truth was that the village occupants knew much more of the British revenue system than Lord Canning did. They perfectly understood that the “supposed proprietary right” enjoyed by the villagers of our adjacent districts, was nothing more than the right to pay their quota directly to the Government instead of to the Talookdar. They knew quite well that any intermediate profit-rent which was lost by the Talookdar would be no gain to them, but would fall into the coffers of Government, and would be expended on objects which, to say the least, they were incapable of appreciating; that they would be deprived of the protection and countenance of their hereditary Chief, and would lose both the “panem” and the “circenses” arising from his local expenditure and genial hospitality.

What a lesson was given, what an example was set between 1848 and 1856, to the Indian people whom we have undertaken to raise into a higher sphere of politics and morals! How well calculated our procedure in these matters of annexation of territory, confiscation of revenue and sequestration of private property, was to make them a law-abiding people, to teach them reverence for our civilised government!

When Lord Dalhousie left Calcutta, after perpetrating the annexation of Oude, the moral influence of Great Britain in India was, for the time, annihilated. On the first rumour of direct provocation applied to their own religious prejudices, the Sepoys led the way in revolt, expecting the Princes and the people everywhere to answer

\* *Papers, Oude Proclamation, 1859, p. 5.*

to their signal and to follow their example. They were mistaken; but they were not nearly as much mistaken as Lord Dalhousie was. They saw, because they suffered from it in long and expensive marches and harder duty, what he failed to see, that instead of our military strength having been combined or consolidated by the annexing operations, it was dispersed and scattered. They very much underrated the conservative instincts and pacific tendencies of Native Sovereigns, but he treated all such considerations with contempt. Like Mr. Grant Duff he relied upon "our own good sword". He declared that "petty intervening Principalities" might be made a "means of annoyance," but could "never be a source of strength," and that by "getting rid of them" we should "acquire continuity of military communication," and "combine our military strength."\* The time of trial soon came, and it was then found that one great source of our strength lay in those "petty intervening Principalities," which not only gave us no "annoyance," but afforded the most serviceable aid in men, money, and moral influence.

The matter stands thus at present. In the full tide of his apparently brilliant career,—under the influence of the vain delusion and shallow exultation so soon to be dissipated amid the horrors of 1857,—Lord Dalhousie recorded his mandates that the two rich reversions of the Mysore State and the Bengal mediatised Principality should be absorbed at the first demise. Are these testamentary injunctions to be carried out, now that the sophisms and equivocations by which they were defended have been exposed, now that the promises of gain in wealth and strength by which they were recommended have been broken and falsified?

With regard to the Mysore State this question was answered in the negative in 1866. The same question is now asked with regard to the Bengal mediatised Principality.

The officials of Calcutta, and the retired officials in London, fought hard for the rich prize of Mysore. They protested, for the most part, their general aversion to the

\* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83.

annexation policy, or at least their submission to the national decree against it embodied in the Royal Proclamation, but they maintained that the case of Mysore was quite "exceptional".

In a similar extremity they will assuredly declare that the case of the Nawab of Bengal is also quite "exceptional", and that they have no evil designs against the general class of titled political stipendiaries. But should they unfortunately prove more successful in this instance than in that of Mysore, it will not be looked upon as an "exceptional case" in India, but will awaken feelings of hatred, alarm and suspicion throughout the Native States as well as in our own Provinces. If the repudiation of the Treaty of 1770 should be confirmed,—if the disinheritance and degradation of the Nawab's family should be decreed, and his descendants pronounced to be henceforth mere "recipients of the bounty of the British Government,"—such a course would be looked upon as a mere return to that policy which has shaken throughout India the belief in British honour, and which has been denounced, more or less plainly, by every leading statesman of Great Britain.

In vain will those who wish to revive Lord Dalhousie's policy try to make any reassuring distinctions for the future between the several classes of his victims, and, while recommencing the attack against the dignities and possessions of one class, profess—perhaps with perfect sincerity for the time,—the deepest regard for the rights of the other classes whose turn has not yet come. Touch one and they all tremble.

Mr. Grant Duff, at the very outset of his speech on the 4th of July, 1871, based his whole argument on an indiscriminating misconception of the social gradations and complicated connections of the classes with whom he has to deal. These are his words:—

"Standing out from the mass of Indian society are three sets of persons whom it is important carefully to distinguish. First you have Native Princes and Chiefs—the heads of famous houses possessing to this day more or less political power; secondly, you have great proprietors—noblemen of high position;

but without any princely prerogative ; and, thirdly, you have a very small class of titled stipendiaries, privileged dependents of the British Government. It is to the third of these classes that the Nawab Nazim really belongs."

But the Under Secretary of State does not explain, evidently because he does not understand, that each of the "three sets" into which he has classified the great families of India, does not comprise a distinct and homogeneous class, but that, whether we consider their rank and dignity, their political importance, or the validity and antiquity of their tenures, there are individuals in the third "set" of "titled stipendiaries" who would be placed by the universal consent and custom of India, and on historical and legal grounds that admit of no dispute, not only above all in the second "set" of "great proprietors, noblemen of high position," but far above many who fall within the first "set" of Princes actually ruling their own territorial dominions.

Nor will this apparent anomaly appear so unreasonable or so difficult of comprehension, if we remember that there are reigning Princes in Europe,—such as those of Monaco, Lichtenstein, Reuss and Lippe,—who do not hold that rank, even in their own estimation, certainly not in the general estimation of continental Courts, that would entitle them to seek matrimonial alliances, for themselves or their children, in any branch of the House of Bourbon, or in the Ex-Royal family of Tuscany or Modena.

And certainly the religious and political views, the plans and movements of the Comte de Chambord, of the Duc d'Aumale, of the present Pope—and, we may add, of the next Pope,—are matters of much more interesting speculation, of much higher diplomatic and public importance, than those of the Prince of Anhalt, the Grand Duke of Baden, or even the King of Saxony.

It is exactly so in the East. There are Princes and Chiefs, ruling very small territories, who, as holding political power, must be included in Mr. Grant Duff's first "set," but who have never been popularly regarded or treated with the respect and deference that are shown

to certain stipendiaries of the third "set," to whom, indeed, higher titles and greater personal honours are accorded even by the British Government. Thus while the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh receives a salute of twenty-one, and the Nawab Nazim of Bengal one of nineteen guns, many Princes of long descent, and exercising all the functions of sovereignty, are only allowed fifteen, and others only eleven,\* while numerous Chieftains having political power and hereditary jurisdiction within their own estates, are entitled to no salute at all.†

Although Mr. Grant Duff in his speech of the 4th July, 1871, speaks, with graceful and becoming urbanity, of "*the shadowy honours of the Nizamut*;" remarks incidentally that one of the Nawabs succeeded to the dignity "*such as it was*;" and, more expressly still, asserts that the Nawab Nazim of Bengal is "*no Prince*," that "*his father was no Prince*," that "*his grandfather was no Prince*," and that "*none of his predecessors have been Indian Princes*;" there is the fact that for more than a century, and during nine lives, they have been treated with Princely honours, that as late as the year 1838 "the accession" of the present Nawab "to the hereditary honours and dignities of the Nizamut and Soobahdarry of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa," was proclaimed "to the Allies of the British Government, and to all friendly Powers," and that all the troops in garrison at Fort William were called out to hear the Proclamation read, and to fire a *feu de joie* on the occasion.‡

Before the Under Secretary again commits himself to any of these official disparagements, or attempts once more to relegate the Nawab Nazim to any third-rate "set" of titled stipendiaries, let him institute a search in the records, and ascertain whether equal or similar honours have ever been accorded at Calcutta to any Prince or Chief, "retaining political power", to any nobleman or great proprietor "of high position", whom he would place

\* *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. iv, pp. 87, 157, 178, 188, etc.; vol. iii, 194, 195, 230.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 58, 285, 317-223; vol. iii, pp. 231-254; vol. v, pp. 334, 338; vol. vi, pp. 145, 361, 503.

‡ *Ante*, pp. 17, 18.

in the first or in the second "set" of persons who "stand out from the mass of Indian society".

The Maharajah of Benares would hold a very high position in Mr. Grant Duff's second set of "noblemen" or "great proprietors," "without any princely prerogatives". His ancestor having formerly possessed civil and criminal jurisdiction and the right of coining money, the rank of a mediatised Prince might be fairly attributed to him. He bears a Princely title. He is allowed a salute of thirteen guns. Lord Canning, as before mentioned, sent the Maharajah of Benares one of the new patents of 1862, in which he was included among "the Princes who now govern their own territories".\* In fact, however, he has no administrative jurisdiction or political power. And the Under Secretary of State for India will, perhaps, be surprised to hear that this great nobleman, being historically and legally nothing more than a Zemindar or landlord, holding his estates under *Sunnuds* and *Pottas*, or grants and leases, from the Nawab Vizier of Oude and the East India Company,† would never venture so far to deviate from the established etiquette of India, as to address the Nawab Nazim of Bengal in any other form than that of an *arzee* or petition, styling himself "a devoted servant".

As to another aspect of the question,—which no statesman ought to overlook, much as it is despised by the bureaucracy of Calcutta,—that of social and political influence among the masses, and the supervision and control of religious movements, especially among the Mahomedans, there are persons in Mr. Grant Duff's third "set," who can act more effectually for or against Imperial interests than many ruling Princes and nobles of great estate in the first and second "set". It is only indirectly, by its connections and communications—too loose and too lukewarm as it is,—with the leaders of Native society and Native opinion, more particularly with those who are its own subjects or dependents, that our Government can exert any guiding or restraining influence over the most dangerous elements of the Indian population.

\* *Ante*, pp. 5, 6.

† *Aitchison's Treaties*, vol. ii.

But in this direction Mr. Grant Duff has no misgivings whatever. In the debate of the 4th of July, 1871, he quite ridiculed the idea that the Nawab Nazim could be a person of great influence in Bengal, or that his wrongs could enlist any popular sympathy.

“It would require an enormous deal of evidence to be brought forward to convince us that the Nawab Nazim was a very popular person, because it is not at all natural that a Mahomedan family, living in the midst of a Hindoo population in Bengal, and which was placed over them by Christian conquerors, should be extremely popular.”

“It would be very remarkable if a population of Hindoos were so fond of a Mahomedan family which never did any good to them or their ancestors, and which was placed over them by Christian conquerors from the other end of the earth.”

This introduction of “Christian conquerors from the other end of the earth” into the argument, when the immediate question is that of comparative popularity, is somewhat remarkable. The topic is embarrassing, not to say inflammatory. The present writer has, however, always protested against the vulgar saying that India is a conquered country; and in the preceding pages has endeavoured to refute the assertion that Bengal was acquired by conquest.\* But even these corrections would be insufficient to set the Under Secretary right. He talks of “a Mahomedan family” having been “placed over a Hindoo population by Christian conquerors.” Is he, then, ignorant that the people of Bengal had been governed by Mahomedan rulers for five hundred years before those whom he calls “Christian conquerors” were able to interfere in Indian politics, and that Meer Jaffier, whom we assisted to depose his relative, Suraj-ood-Dowlah, was a member of the reigning family?

Surely when he drew that picture of “a Mahomedan family,” placed by “Christian conquerors” over a “Hindoo population,” he must have been ignorant, or must for the moment have forgotten, that at least a fifth of the population of Bengal, and probably quite one half of the population above the degree and intelligence of an agricultural or day labourer, is Mahomedan.

\* *Ante*, p. 43 to 47.

It is possible that since the debate of the 4th of July, 1871, Mr. Grant Duff may have been somehow reminded of the fact that Bengal having been subject to Mahomedan Princes for five centuries before the alliance between the Nawab Meer Jaffier and the East India Company, is not inhabited by a purely "Hindoo population." Perhaps he may have heard that Calcutta, the official metropolis of India, contains at least 150,000 Mussulman inhabitants; that above 100,000 may be found in the great city of Dacca, worshipping in 180 mosques; and that there are quite as many at Patna, the head-quarters of Wahabee propagandism.

A flash of lurid light was thrown last year on that unmanageable amalgam of Puritan revival and privy conspiracy by the assassination of Chief Justice Norman, a terrible catastrophe closely connected in time and place and circumstance—to say the least,—with the appeals to the High Court of Bengal of certain wealthy persons charged with complicity in the recruitment and maintenance of a permanent camp of Wahabee fanatics beyond the North West frontier of the Punjab. Possibly this deplorable event, and the discussions preceding and following it in the periodical and other publications of last year,\* may have attracted the attention of some English statesmen, if not of Mr. Grant Duff himself, to the general condition, principles and practices of the Mahomedans in India, especially in Bengal.

The extent and the dangers of Mussulman disaffection and fanaticism may be exaggerated by alarmists, but they may also be unduly depreciated by official optimists. The population of Bengal includes a considerable Mahomedan element, of which the social and political importance cannot be measured by its numerical strength. It is pretty well understood that, as compared with most of the other Native races, the Hindoo Bengalees are not

\* In particular Dr. W. W. Hunter's remarkable treatise, "*The Mussulmans of India, Are they bound to rebel against the Queen?*" (Trübner and Co.) The facts on which the author founds his arguments and conclusions are almost exclusively taken from the history and customs of the Bengalee Mahomedans.

noted for physical energy, or for prompt and practical vigour of action. Unquestionable as may be the good will and enlightened self-interest of individuals or large communities among what may be considered this distinctly marked nationality, it would be a mistake to rely too much on the moral support or material aid they might be expected to furnish to the British Government in a time of seething excitement or open insurrection. The Bengalees have not, from time immemorial, been in the habit of bearing arms, or entering any military service, and even if they were inclined to enrol themselves on our side at a dangerous crisis or in the midst of an actual outbreak, the hour would not be opportune for the acceptance of such an offer, nor would the aid of raw recruits, even of the best quality, be efficient or immediately available.

In many other respects there are marked distinctions in character and bearing, as well as in social customs and in what we may call the rule and purpose of life, not only between the Bengalee Hindoos and the Mahomedans, but between the Bengalees and the Hindoos of other Provinces. The Mahomedans have their own history, their own literature and science, and are proud of them. They are strongly attached to their own religion,—a monotheistic faith, compatible, as we may see in the Levant and in the North of Africa, with a very high degree—however inferior to that of Christian Europe,—of social and political advancement. If the Mussulman children of India resorted generally, which unfortunately but a small proportion of them do, to the English schools, either of Government or of the Missionary Societies, there is no reason to believe that their faith would be undermined. Islam is not as yet effete. The Missionaries are not understood to have made many converts among the followers of that creed, which steadily but unobtrusively continues to make proselytes in every direction, from every tribe, and in every rank.\*

\* The late Gaekwar of Baroda had the strongest predilections for the Mussulman faith, which he evinced by costly offerings to the Caaba at Mecca, and to other Moslem shrines. Mr. A. C. Lyall (of the Bengal

But the Bengalees have eagerly availed themselves of all the opportunities that have been afforded them of acquiring Western culture; and Hindoo society, in consequence, is deeply saturated with scepticism. The Bengalee Baboos crowd the educational institutions of Government; they display extraordinary ability in speculative and analytical studies, and attain great proficiency in the English language. They are consequently to be found in almost every Province of India North of the Godavery, occupying the best posts in the public administration open to "uncovenanted" servants, and everywhere highly valued for their talents and acquirements. But, abroad or at home, the Baboo is always a Bengalee, strong in the local attachments of his birth-place, almost isolated among the Hindoos of other districts, or associating with a small circle of his fellow provincials, and gravitating, as he gains in years and competence, towards the scenes of his early life with the certainty of a law of nature. The ties and interests of a Bengalee beyond the Delta of the Ganges are as loose and as temporary as are those of the majority of our countrymen in any part of India.

The Mahomedan, on the contrary, must be somewhat of a cosmopolitan. His creed is his country. If he has not learnt modern geography at school, he has picked up from religious teachers, from relatives or neighbours who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca or Kerbela, a strange mixture of ancient history and legend, local description and recent political information, as to Arabistan, the fountain-head of the faith, as to Rûm, Misr and Irân.\* The proportions may be distorted, the details may be rudely

Civil Service, Commissioner of West Berar), in a remarkable article in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1872, on "The Religion of an Indian Province," speaks of "the perceptible proclivity toward the faith of Islam exhibited by some of the leading Princes of Rajpootana." The Governor-General's Agent for Central India, in his Report for 1866-7 (Calcutta, 1868), paragraph 92, p. 17, describing the condition of the petty State of Rajgurh, regrets the continuance of an "unsatisfactory state of feeling between the Rawut and his family and brotherhood, consequent on his alleged adoption of the Mahomedan faith, and certain proceedings of his in connection therewith."

\* Turkey, Egypt, and Persia.

drawn, but the general effect of the picture is grand and impressive. Thus the horizon of the young Mussulman is widely extended beyond that of his own town or district, and even beyond the continent of India. In any part of the Peninsula the Mussulman is at home among his co-religionists, who all speak the Indian *lingua franca*, Hindustani, many of them—the higher class especially,—being unacquainted with the vernacular dialect of the Province in which they were born. In the recently published words of Mr. W. G. Palgrave, of all Englishmen living perhaps the most competent judge:—“When we take counsel on our Indo-Mahomedan subjects, we should accustom ourselves to look on them, not as an isolated clique, girt in by our power, our institutions, and, if need be, our bayonets, but as part and parcel of the great brotherhood that radiates from Mecca.” “With more justice,” he continues, “than the first converts of Christianity, the Muslim may boast that ‘the multitude of them that believe are of one heart and of one soul’; loss or gain are reckoned among them in common, the grievance of one is the grievance of all.”\*

It may well be doubted whether the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Grant Duff, or any of the authorities at Calcutta or in London, have ever understood, or cared to understand, how the grievance of a Mussulman Princely family, deposed and impoverished by their “Christian conquerors,” becomes the direct, palpable, bitter grievance of all Mahomedans within a certain range, and spreads from that range as a topic of hatred and invective wherever a Mahomedan is to be found in India. There being no priesthood, properly so called, for the devotions and ceremonies of the Mussulman religion, the Prince or local dignitary is everywhere the spiritual chief, the patron and guardian of religious rites and learning, takes the leading part at certain great festivals and other solemn assemblies, and defrays a large proportion of the regular and occasional expenses of public worship and theological instruction. Thus the deposition and spoliation of a great

\* *Fraser's Magazine*, February, 1872, “The Mahometan Revival,” p. 252.

Mussulman House is always, to a greater or less degree, the disestablishment and disendowment of the Mussulman religion.

In the very remarkable essay we have already quoted, Mr. Palgrave observes that no confidence must be placed on the mutual jealousies and animosities of the Mahomedan sects.

“So strong, indeed, is the bond of union supplied by the very name of Islam, even where that name covers the most divergent principles and beliefs, that, in presence of the ‘infidel,’ the deep clefts which divide Soonee and Sheeah are for a time and purpose obliterated; and the most heretical sects become awhile amalgamated with the most uncompromisingly orthodox, who, in another cause, would naturally reject and disavow them.”\*

Mr. Palgrave also calls attention to the strange combination of the puritanical Unitarianism of the Wahabee with the Sheeah superstitions of “Imām” and “Mahdee,” and “the secret association and murderous practices of the Ismaeleeyah or Assassins, in the Mussulman movement now at work in India.† We must not, therefore, calculate on fanaticism dividing the Mussulman sects. It seems rather to draw them together more closely, and would certainly do so under the influence of the alleged provocation or persecution of “Christian conquerors.”

Mr. Grant Duff may, possibly, be so far better informed and better advised on this question than he was last year, that he will not again venture to speak as if he were merely disposing of a single Mahomedan family, isolated, and not very popular, in the midst of a “Hindoo population.” But still he may think that he is right to this extent, that there are strong distinctions and an incompatibility of aims and ends between Hindoos and Mahomedans that will always render them antagonistic. Do not let him reckon overmuch upon that. We have referred to some of the distinctions that exist. We consider the problem of Mussulman disaffection to be the most urgent one of the day, and would recommend English statesmen not to jump too eagerly at any chance of aggravating the peculiar grievances that provoke it. But there are many directions

\* *Fraser's Magazine*, February, 1872, p. 252.

† *Ibid.*, p. 253.

in which Hindoos and Mahomedans have grievances in common. If the rulers of India rely for impunity in the disestablishment and disendowment of the Nawab Nazim, and other Mussulman Princes to follow, upon their not being "very popular persons" among the Hindoo commonalty, they lean upon a broken reed. Even were the Hindoos of Bengal as likely to be warlike partisans as they are to be well-disposed subjects under the British Government, they are by no means ill-disposed to their Mussulman fellow-countrymen. Many very striking phenomena that presented themselves in the course of the rebellion of 1857, and many occurrences of more recent date, warn us that for the future we must only count to a very slight extent upon religious animosity and rivalry preventing political combinations in India. There is nothing now between us and the masses, but their Princes. And the Princes, if we do not spurn them or despoil them, are entirely subject to our influence. We may continue to administer our Provinces in quiet times, and maintain a military predominance though a chaos of blood and fire come again, but we cannot govern India with honour and profit to ourselves and with benefit to the people, without the aid of their natural leaders.

It would be interesting and instructive to hear on what moral and social forces and influences the present responsible authorities rely, in the presence of the religious and political effervescence now perceptible in India, for the preservation of good order, or for its timely restoration if it should be disturbed. Are they really of opinion that the best measure for meeting the possible consequences of a Mussulman revival, is that of disestablishing and disendowing the few Mussulman dignitaries that remain?

Perpetual defensive and offensive preparations, and reliance on "our own good sword" in days of quiet, and immediate resort to its use in troublous times, would not, we trust, constitute in Mr. Grant Duff's political science the most effectual and the most economical machinery for guiding and governing India.

Perhaps we may be told that the Government relies on the civilising and pacificating effects of education, and we

may be referred to the evidence contained in Dr. W. W. Hunter's book,\* that there are Literary Societies of Mahomedan gentlemen at Calcutta and at Allahabad, who emphatically express their attachment to British rule, and who have spread abroad by all the means in their power the formal opinions of certain learned Moulavees that Islam is not persecuted in India, and that the followers of that faith are not bound to seek for an opportunity of waging a *Jihād* or religious war against the Christian Government. There is something very suggestive of wild counsels and dangerous doctrine having been on foot, in the public-spirited and honourable resolution with which these educated Mahomedans have procured, and promulgated with their own comments, these *futwas* from the Doctors of the Law at Mecca, which, after all, are by no means conclusive or unambiguous. But are those who are so sure that the Nawab of Bengal is *not* very popular or influential, equally sure that these enlightened English-speaking Mussulman gentlemen *are* very popular and influential among their co-religionists, and particularly among the extreme zealots?

If any such notion anywhere prevails, or any notion that their interpretation of the Koran is likely to have superior weight, it may be confidently pronounced to be very ill-founded. The very reverse was found to be the case during the mutinies and rebellion of 1857. English speaking Natives, and those who were supposed to have English tastes and sympathies, were looked upon as renegades and spies, and were hunted out almost as remorselessly as if they had been Europeans. In the event of a really formidable outbreak such persons, especially if they came forward and endeavoured to stem the tide, would be swept away in the first riot. A single messenger from the Nawab of Bengal would have more influence for good over a Mussulman mob than a grand procession of all the members of the Mahomedan Literary Societies of Allahabad and Calcutta.

We may leave here the question of the social and political influence of some "titled stipendiaries" placed in

\* *The Indian Mussulmans* (Trübner and Co.)

Mr. Grant Duff's third "set," as compared with that of some reigning Princes in the first "set," and some noblemen and great proprietors in the second, and—setting aside all considerations of right and wrong—merely ask one question more. Is it advisable to destroy, diminish and pervert that influence by dishonouring and disendowing those who possess it?

Let us now consider the comparative validity and permanence of the tenure by which some "titled stipendiaries" hold their dignities and revenues.

Mr. Grant Duff evidently regards the tenure of those whom he has included in his third "set" as very precarious, as little better than a tenure at will, or, at best, for one life, renewable on the same or worse terms at the pleasure of superior power. He says that "towards these three sets of persons, the people of these Islands, as represented by the great officers of the Queen in India, have well-defined duties to fulfil. The Native Princes and Chiefs have their rights, the great proprietors have their rights, and the titled stipendiaries have their rights also." But he evidently considers the rights of the third "set" to be much weaker than those of the first and second, to be, in fact, little more than the right to take what is given them, and be thankful for it. They are "privileged dependents of the British Government," "recipients of its bounty"; the present Nawab Nazim is "the ninth successor of Meer Jaffier in the favour of the British Government;" and the stipend paid to the Nizamut family was not paid "under the provisions of a Treaty, but out of free grace and favour."

There is nothing exactly new in all this, though it only dates from 1848, and we have not heard much of it since 1856. It is an echo of the voice of Lord Dalhousie, who, for example, in terms very much resembling these, denied all inherent right of the Bhonsla family of Nagpore to permanent sovereignty. He said that if the deceased Rajah's grand-nephew were allowed to succeed, it would be "the gratuitous alienation of the State of Nagpore for the second time, in favour of a Mahratta youth."\*

\* *Papers, Rajah of Berar* (416 of 1854), p. 26.

“The continuance of the Raj of Nagpore under a Mah-ratta ruler,” would be “an act of grace and favour on the part of the British Government.”\*

Mr. Grant Duff may think he has no bad intentions towards the Native Sovereigns in his first “set”, and may sincerely consider their tenure more valid and secure than that of his third “set” of titled stipendiaries; but let him revive the fashion of crying down perpetual Treaties as mere personal grants, and privileges and possessions, enjoyed for a century, during five successions, as mere matters of “bounty,” “grace and favour,” and he will soon find that he has done much more than he intended. Let him give the officials of Calcutta the fresh departure—only just missed in the case of Mysore,—of another series of Treaties nullified, another great family disinherited with full Parliamentary sanction, and they will not wait very long for opportunities of sweeping, one by one, some of all three “sets” off the board. There are many families of Princes and Chieftains in the first, and many more in the second “set,” who hold an inferior and more obscure position in the Indian world than the Nawab of Bengal, whose extinction would be much less noticed and much less felt, and against whose hereditary rights a much more plausible tale might be concocted.

Of course it is much easier, for obvious reasons, to oust the holder of a pension or charge on the revenue, than to oust the holder of a landed estate. If the Red Spectre should ever come to rule in these Islands, our “titled stipendiaries” of the third “set,” such as the Duke of Marlborough, Earl Nelson and Viscount Exmouth, will probably lose their perpetual pensions before the Duke of Argyll is deprived of Inverary, or Mr. Grant Duff expelled from Eden. But when the third “set” in England are being deprived of their stipends held under a Parliamentary title, the second and even the first “set” may very naturally begin to feel a little anxious. And so it is, and so it will be among the Princes of India, if the Red Spectre which they know so well is allowed to recommence operations.

\* *Ibid.*, p. 36.

But then Mr. Grant Duff says that the third "set" in India is a very small one,—there is "a very small class of titled stipendiaries." It is very much larger, we venture to say, than the Under Secretary supposes; and it is very much larger than the corresponding class in this country. If he means that there are very few individuals in the class who in rank or in revenue can be compared with the Nawab Nazim, he is quite right, but that reason can hardly, of itself, justify the abolition of the dignity.

The class of titled stipendiaries in India, from every point of view, is one of far greater importance than the corresponding class in any European country. It is, also,—if there can be degrees of comparison in such matters,—deserving of far greater consideration, if only for this reason, that perpetual pensions in Europe have been granted, in the best and most defensible cases, as rewards for public services, and frequently, under colour of public services, on very illegitimate grounds or by mere court favour. But in India most political stipends of any magnitude were not so much the results of a grant as the results of a contract, where valuable consideration was given; and even in cases where the status of the original stipendiary was not such as to admit of a Treaty or agreement, there are very few instances in which the stipend can be said to have been of the nature of a compassionate allowance, given out of mere grace and favour. If traced to their origin they will be found almost invariably to be of the nature of reasonable and moderate compensation to a family of rank and influence for the loss of possessions and privileges, sometimes of sinecure or hereditary office, on the introduction of British rule.

There is a political stipendiary, the Gond Rajah, residing at Nagpore, who occupied under the Mahratta Government of the Bhonsla a position very analogous to that occupied by the Nawab Nazim of Bengal under our Government. About the time that Clive was consolidating British power in Bengal, Rughojee Bhonsla, under a commission from his Suzerain the Rajah of Sattara, was conquering Gondwana, now included in the Central Provinces. Having interfered originally—as we interfered in

Bengal,—to assist one branch of the reigning family against the other, the Mahratta General seized on the entire administration of the country, but maintained the dignity of the Gond Rajah, allowed him one sixteenth of the land revenue, to be collected in each district by his own officers, and left him in possession of his Palace in the city of Nagpore. When the Bhonsla afterwards determined to assume the position of Sovereign, the Gond Rajah, as acknowledged Lord of the Soil, was called on to place the *tiluk* or mark of royalty on the Mahratta Rajah's forehead; and this ceremony was repeated at every succession. On this occasion, and at one festival in the year, the Bhonsla presented the Gond Rajah, as his ceremonial superior for the time being, with a *nuzzur* or tribute-offering. The Gond Rajah's seal was also required to many public documents.

The motives and policy of the Mahratta Prince in thus upholding the ancient Sovereign whom he had, in fact, superseded, were doubtless very similar to those which induced the East India Company to uphold the Nawab Nazim. First, he did not wish to offend the numerous Gond Chieftains and the large Gond population within the territories of Nagpore; secondly, he wished to avoid recognising directly the Suzerainty of the Rajah of Satara or of the Peishwa, as Executive Head of the Mahratta Confederation, over the dominions which he professed to hold in a sort of trusteeship, and under a sort of double Government, from the Autochthonous Lord.

The Gond Rajah, though never contracting a marriage out of his own aboriginal tribe, is a Mahomedan by religion, one of his ancestors having been converted at Delhi by the Emperor Akbar. On the introduction of British administration into the Nagpore territories he could, of course, be no longer permitted to collect his customary share of the revenue by means of his own officers; and his receipts were commuted into a fixed annual stipend of about £10,000 a year. He has no Treaty, no *sunnud* to show for it. In the very words applied by Lord Dalhousie to the Nawab Nazim, "he has no right or title whatever to any allowance by treaty or

compact, or by virtue of any agreement." Is his tenure of this allowance better or worse now than it was under the Mahratta Government? What does Mr. Grant Duff think of him? Is he merely "a recipient of the bounty of the British Government"?

In order to see what prospect there is of a fair provision in the future for mediatised families, if the doctrines and procedure of Lord Dalhousie's administration are brought into use again, let us turn once more to the case of Nagpore, and observe some circumstances that followed the annexation.

Having annexed the State and annulled the family, Lord Dalhousie then appropriated the Rajah's private treasure, jewels, wardrobe, plate and crockery, turned everything into cash by public auction, and allotted the widows and other relatives—carefully excluding the grand-nephew and adopted heir,\*—pensions out of the proceeds, to which he gave the name of "the Bhonsla Fund."†

This is just what Mr. Grant Duff promises to do for the Nizamut family. He says:—

"We do not propose to continue the Moorshedabad family to all time coming as an old man of the sea round the neck of the people of India; but we do propose to continue to it a very considerable position, and to form for it out of this Nizamut Fund, —for mismanaging which we are taken so much to task—and otherwise if needs be, a splendid inheritance."

The "Nizamut Fund" happens to be the property of the family already. This has been officially acknowledged over and over again, even as late as the critical despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated the 17th of June, 1864. In paragraph VII (that part of it which became paragraph VIII in the doctored copy sent to the Nawab,‡) the following words occur:—

\* Recognised in 1859 by Lord Canning as the head of the Bhonsla family, *ante*, p. 6.

† See the Author's *Empire in India*, p. 220-250; and *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*, p. 265-270.

‡ See Introduction.

“It is unnecessary to trace further the history of the Fund. Its accumulations, representing as they do the unappropriated portions from year to year of the sixteen lacs stipend, unquestionably belong to the Nazim and his family, and can properly be expended only for their benefit.”\*

From the first establishment of the several accounts eventually consolidated into the Nizamut Deposit Fund, it has been repeatedly and continuously acknowledged by our Government as “the inalienable property” of the Nawab Nazim and his family, “the sacred inheritance of the Nizamut.” This Fund was originally formed by the appropriation of a part of the private treasure left by the Munnee Begum, grandmother of the Nawab Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah,—widow of the Nawab Meer Jaffier Ali, and commonly called ‘the Mother of the Company,’—and by the absorption of the allowance that had been made to her out of her grandson’s income (which, with her property, would have reverted to the Nawab as her heir), and was annually augmented by the lapsed allowances of deceased relations and other stoppages from the Nizamut stipend, under successive arrangements with the Nawab for the time being. On various occasions the Nawabs remonstrated against the large and increasing amount of the annual stipends that was withdrawn from their personal control, but they were always assured it was for their own benefit. In reply to one of these remonstrances in 1817, the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, expressed himself as follows in a letter to his Highness :—

“The money forming the Fund thus obtained, amounting to seven lacs of Rupees, is considered and recognised as the inalienable property of Your Highness’s Family, over and above the sixteen lacs of Rupees per annum assigned for its support.”\*

In a despatch from the Government of India dated 28th February, 1823, the Governor-General desires that the object of these accumulations may be impressed upon the Nawab Nazim, in answer to some of his demands and objections.

\* *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (371 of 1870), p. 4.

† *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), p. 16.

“The plan of reserving this Fund was adopted with a view to place in the hands of Government a means of relieving any exigencies in which the family might be involved, as well as of portioning the daughters, and providing buildings, or other operations of the kind, involving a present sacrifice of capital.”\*

And in a letter to the Governor-General, dated April 24th, 1840,—two years after the accession of the present Nawab,—the Court of Directors make the following comment on a proposal for certain grants to some of the Nawab’s relatives whose houses had been damaged by an inundation, in the course of which the Deputy Governor of Bengal had incidentally spoken of the Nizamut Deposit Fund as “public money.”

“The Deposit Fund is not ‘public money,’ but a part of the assignment secured by Treaty to the Family, which part is allowed to accumulate for its general benefit.”†

We must, therefore, commend to Mr. Grant Duff’s consideration, before he again talks of forming “a splendid inheritance” for the Moorshedabad family out of the Nizamut Deposit Fund, that he would not be dealing there with “public money,” but with “the sacred inheritance,” “the inalienable property,” of the family in question, “part of the assignment secured” to it “by Treaty.” He is only proposing to do for the Moorshedabad family exactly what Lord Dalhousie did for the Bhonsla family,—to sequestrate their income assigned by Treaty, likewise to appropriate the Fund formed of savings and deductions from that income, and then to permit them to subsist on “liberal” pensions taken out of their confiscated capital. A “splendid” offer truly, and worthy of Imperial power!

Let it also be observed that the stipend of sixteen lakhs of rupees per annum, for the whole of which the present Nawab Nazim’s receipt is regularly required, and of which distinct accounts are kept, is declared by the Home Government in 1840, two years after the present Nawab’s accession, to be the “assignment secured by Treaty to the family”; and that the Nizamut Fund, formed by investing “a part of the assignment,” is declared not to be “public money.” How is it, then, that

\* *Ibid.*, p. 24.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

in these days we find the Home Government and the authorities at Calcutta declaring, in direct contradiction to all this, that the Nizamut stipend is *not* "an assignment secured by Treaty" to the Nawab and his family, but is paid out of "free grace and favour," and that the Nizamut Fund is public money, out of which, when our Government is pleased to cease paying the stipend, a provision may be made for the Nawab's descendants? How and when did this thorough change in the professions and intentions of our Government, arise?

The answer is direct and positive. It arose under the administration of Lord Dalhousie, in the course of his operations and prospective arrangements "for increasing our financial resources," by "availing ourselves of every just opportunity of acquiring territory, and revenue" and "ultimate reversions."\* It arose in 1853, and cannot be traced to an earlier year. To prove this, we have only to cite the latest despatch on the subject from the Government of India that has been published, dated 29th July, 1870, (paragraph 3):—

"As respects the Nawab Nazim's alleged Treaty claims, we would observe that they have more than once been rejected. The Government of Lord Dalhousie, after full deliberation, came to the conclusion in 1853, that the Nawab has no right or title whatever to any allowance by Treaty or compact; that the three Treaties which are upon record are purely personal agreements, which expired with the individuals with whom each was concluded; and they were not renewed after the death of Mobaruk-ood-Dowlah in 1796."\*

It is obvious that if the officials of Calcutta could have raked out of their records, from any Government, or from any adviser or servant of Government, anterior to that of Lord Dalhousie, a single sheet or a leaf, or a rag, to cover the nakedness of these assertions, they would have done so. But it was impossible. Nothing earlier than 1853 would bear quotation. They could only repeat the discreditable and utterly discredited perversions of history and law for which that baneful epoch has become for ever notorious,—that epoch during which, by means of the

\* *Ante*, p 53. † *Papers, Nawab Nazim* (116 of 1871), pp. 2, 3.

same perversions and prevarications that are once more proffered for our acceptance, the faithful and friendly Houses of Sattara, Jhansi, Nagpore, Tanjore and the Carnatic were degraded and despoiled, and those of Mysore and Bengal (*with several others*) menaced and condemned. By the statesmanlike determination of Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote, supported by a minority of great weight in the Indian Council, and a majority amounting to unanimity in Parliament, the condemnation of the Mysore State was reversed. Is the condemnation of the titular Nizamut of Bengal to be maintained ?

If so, let those who represent the nation, and with whom it ultimately rests to ordain or sanction every doubtful act of Imperial power, understand clearly what they are asked to do. They are asked, in defiance of all the manifest proofs of the *damnosa hæreditas* entailed upon us by Lord Dalhousie's dispositions, to execute another secret codicil of his political testament.

They can do it, if they like, without fear of any immediate convulsion or evident mischief. Perhaps the evil effects of the execution might altogether escape notice at the time, and be quite undistinguishable amid the phenomena of some future crisis, when nothing may be clear except that something has gone wrong. We must not be suspected of saying or suggesting any such ridiculous exaggeration as that the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, or any rightful claimant of that dignity,—even if he had the inclination,—would have the power of raising a formidable rebellion against our Government, or of offering any open resistance to the deposition and spoliation of the family. We do not imagine the Nizamut to be so popular an institution, that its downfall would be the signal for an insurrection, even on the pettiest scale. We do not suppose that the abolition of what Mr. Grant Duff calls “the misleading title of Nazim” would paralyse the administration of Bengal. He is quite right in saying that the Nawabs “have ceased to be in any sense Administrators”; and so have Dukes ceased to be in any sense Leaders, and Marquises have ceased in any sense to guard the Marches, and Earls to preside, in any sense, over Shires.

But when the Under Secretary of State denounces "the luxurious repose of Moorsshedabad," as "a thoroughly bad and corrupting influence," we think he goes, in every way, too far. He merely emulates the democratic enthusiasts of the Hole in the Wall: his denunciations are about as relevant and about as reasonable as their indignation against "the bloated aristocracy" of Great Britain. We estimate the social and political influence of the Nawab, and of the class which he represents, more highly than the Under Secretary does, and we have given some reasons already for our higher valuation. Nawabs and Rajahs within the British Provinces of India no longer guide the ship of the State, and yet they may serve to trim the vessel, and make its course more steady. The steam-engines of some great iron-clad may be in perfect order,—there may be no danger of the boiler bursting,—but it would not be advisable to heave the ballast into the sea. The ship might dance more buoyantly on the waves for a time. But let a storm come! Even her guns won't save her then. The best way, indeed, to lighten her burden, if that had been the one thing wanted, would have been to throw *them* overboard.

Never was our military strength in India greater, absolutely and relatively, than it is at present. But it is not by over-running and occupying, punishing and plundering, one disturbed Province after another, that a vast continent, inhabited by two hundred millions of men, can be profitably, progressively and honourably governed. One whose voice during twenty years at least was ever raised in favour of scrupulous good faith in the interpretation of treaties, and in all dealings with the Princes of India, and whose retirement from a sphere where his influence was weighty and special is very much to be regretted, Captain W. J. Eastwick, remarked in his Minute dated 25th July, 1865, against the annexation of Mysore —

"In all cases like Mysore we must not take too circumscribed a view. We must look upon the effect it will have upon the feeling of the people of India generally. If we outrage their sense of justice, if we act in the teeth of any deeply rooted sentiment, which is not condemned by the universal voice of mankind, there

will, sooner or later, be an avenging Nemesis, and the stability of our rule will be endangered. An eminent and lamented statesman" (Sir G. C. Lewis) "justly writes: 'The only stable foundation for a Government is its moral authority: so long as it is looked up to with respect, confidence, and esteem by the body of the people, it stands on a rock.' These essentials wanting, it is an edifice built on sand."\*

And here is a passage worthy of notice from the writings of one of those great soldier-statesmen who saw the political domination of Great Britain in India designed, gained and consolidated, and who took an active part in every stage of the transition from suppliance to acknowledged supremacy.

"Our Empire is held solely by opinion,—in other words by that respect and awe with which the comparative superiority of our knowledge, justice, and system of rule, has inspired the inhabitants of our own territories; and that confidence in our truth, reliance on our faith, and dread of our arms, which is impressed on every nation in India."†

Is it desirable that all these moral safeguards,—respect for our justice, confidence in our truth, reliance on our faith,—should disappear, and nothing but the dread of our arms be left? If so, we shall assuredly soon find out for ourselves the truth of the warning addressed in vain to Austria in Italy,—“You can do anything with bayonets except sit down upon them.” There can be no peaceful progress in an atmosphere of distrust and disbelief. On the other hand, there is no fighting against it. It is useless to beat the air. A Government cannot show face or hold its own for a day against a general contempt of authority without a great display of military force; but all the military force imaginable cannot crush it or put it down. The troops—as many as can be trusted when such a spirit is abroad—may march and counter-march and manœuvre to admiration, but they cannot be everywhere at once; they cannot collect revenue; they cannot restore life to trade; they cannot attract passengers or goods to the railways, for the receipts of which the Indian

\* *Mysore Papers* (112 of 1866), p. 79.

† *Sir John Malcolm's Political History of India*, vol. i, p. 145.

finances are now so deeply pledged; they cannot protect those railways from destruction.

Once allow that utter want of confidence in our good will and good faith which prevailed in 1856, when the Marquis of Dalhousie handed over the reins of Government to Lord Canning, to be again diffused throughout India, and the mine will be then loaded, the train once more prepared. In one of those inflammable seasons—almost of periodical occurrence, and always to be borne in mind as possibilities,—when famine or pestilence or foreign war causes general distress, and suffering and searching of heart, the spark may be very easily furnished, and an explosion, visible or underground, may shake the foundations of Imperial supremacy.

What we have now to dread in India, is not so much armed rebellion,—the time may have gone by for that,—not so much constitutional opposition and agitation,—the time has not yet come—as the rapid and unseen spread of a spirit of discontent, disrespect and disobedience, leading with sure and fatal steps to a period of passive resistance, with just enough of chronic terrorism and occasional violence to make the country too hot for our administrators, and the administration so costly as to ruin the Indian finances and destroy Indian credit.

The concurrent and urgent counsels of the highest responsible authorities of the day tell us that this is not a time for playing fast and loose with the moral safe-guards of government, or for beginning once more that endless game of 'Beggars my neighbour,' at which we have already lost both money and reputation. All the tricks of that game will never fill our treasury or raise our credit.

THE END.

*By the same Author.*

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
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